Related papers: Capacity Variation in the Many-to-one Stable Match…
During a hospital stay, a roommate can significantly influence a patient's overall experience both positivly and negatively. Therefore, hospital staff tries to assign patients together to a room that are likely to be compatible. However,…
We introduce the problem of adapting a stable matching to forced and forbidden pairs. Specifically, given a stable matching $M_1$, a set $Q$ of forced pairs, and a set $P$ of forbidden pairs, we want to find a stable matching that includes…
Rising provider turnover results in frequently needing to rematch patients with available providers. However, the rematching process is cumbersome for both patients and health systems, resulting in labor-intensive and ad hoc reassignments.…
We investigate a portfolio selection problem involving multi competitive agents, each exhibiting mean-variance preferences. Unlike classical models, each agent's utility is determined by their relative wealth compared to the average wealth…
We consider a variant of the berth allocation problem-i.e., the multi-port berth allocation problem-aimed at assigning berthing times and positions to vessels in container terminals. This variant involves optimizing vessel travel speeds…
We study a spatiotemporal service matching problem in which demand, heterogeneous in location and time sensitivity/preference, is to be assigned to service stations. The planner seeks to maximize social welfare, defined as total service…
We consider the problem of assigning agents to programs in the presence of two-sided preferences, commonly known as the Hospital Residents problem. In the standard setting each program has a rigid upper-quota which cannot be violated.…
Effective hospital capacity management is pivotal for enhancing patient care quality, operational efficiency, and healthcare system resilience, notably during demand spikes like those seen in the COVID-19 pandemic. However, devising optimal…
In the house allocation problem with lower and upper quotas, we are given a set of applicants and a set of projects. Each applicant has a strictly ordered preference list over the projects, while the projects are equipped with a lower and…
We consider a far generalization of the well-known stable roommates and non-bipartite stable allocation problems. In its setting, one is given a finite non-bipartite graph $G=(V,E)$ with nonnegative integer edge capacities $b(e)\in{\mathbb…
We consider the group testing problem, in the case where the items are defective independently but with non-constant probability. We introduce and analyse an algorithm to solve this problem by grouping items together appropriately. We give…
Technological progress is leading to proliferation and diversification of trading venues, thus increasing the relevance of the long-standing question of market fragmentation versus consolidation. To address this issue quantitatively, we…
Roommate problems with convex preferences always have stable matchings. Efficiency and individual rationality are, moreover, compatible with strategyproofness in such convex roommate problems. Both of these results fail without the…
Centralized assignment markets have historically relied on Deferred-Acceptance (DA) algorithms, which do not incorporate multiple objectives into the assignment. In this work, we propose an optimization-based many-to-one assignment…
The problem of designing a profit-maximizing, Bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational mechanism with flexible consumers and costly heterogeneous supply is considered. In our setup, each consumer is associated with a…
We study a decision-maker's problem of finding optimal monetary incentive schemes for retention when faced with agents whose participation decisions (stochastically) depend on the incentive they receive. Our focus is on policies constrained…
In networks, there are often more than one source of capacity. The capacities can be permanently or temporarily owned by the decision maker. Depending on the nature of sources, we identify the permanent capacity, spot market capacity and…
We thoroughly study a generalized version of the classic Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates problems where agents may share partners. We consider two prominent stability concepts: ordinal stability [Aharoni and Fleiner, Journal of…
All over the world, especially in the university environment, planning managers and traffic engineers are constantly faced with the problem of inadequate allocation of car parking spaces to demanded users. Users could either prefer reserved…
We study a practical two-sided matching problem of allocating children to daycare centers, which has significant social implications. We are cooperating with several municipalities in Japan and our goal is to devise a reliable and…