Related papers: Capacity Variation in the Many-to-one Stable Match…
We study many-to-one matching problems between institutions and individuals, where each institution may be matched to multiple individuals. The matching market includes couples, who view pairs of institutions as complementary. Institutions'…
Given two point sets S and T, in a many-to-many matching between S and T each point in S is assigned to one or more points in T and vice versa. A generalization of the many-to-many matching problem is the limited capacity many-to-many…
Machine learning models are often used to make predictions about admissions process outcomes, such as for colleges or jobs. However, such decision processes differ substantially from the conventional machine learning paradigm. Because…
A variant of the classical optimal transportation problem is: among all joint measures with fixed marginals and which are dominated by a given density, find the optimal one. Existence and uniqueness of solutions to this variant were…
This paper studies flexible multi-facility capacity expansion with risk aversion. In this setting, the decision maker can periodically expand the capacity of facilities given observations of uncertain demand. We model this situation as a…
Several countries successfully use centralized matching schemes for school or higher education assignment, or for entry-level labour markets. In this paper we explore the computational aspects of a possible similar scheme for assigning…
In this paper we initiate the study of the heterogeneous capacitated $k$-center problem: given a metric space $X = (F \cup C, d)$, and a collection of capacities. The goal is to open each capacity at a unique facility location in $F$, and…
We study uncoordinated matching markets with additional local constraints that capture, e.g., restricted information, visibility, or externalities in markets. Each agent is a node in a fixed matching network and strives to be matched to…
In the stable marriage problem, a set of men and a set of women are given, each of whom has a strictly ordered preference list over the acceptable agents in the opposite class. A matching is called stable if it is not blocked by any pair of…
Many-to-one matching markets exist in numerous different forms, such as college admissions, matching medical interns to hospitals for residencies, assigning housing to college students, and the classic firms and workers market. In all these…
We consider a many-to-one variant of the stable matching problem. More concretely, we consider the variant of the stable matching problem where one side has a matroid constraint. Furthermore, we consider the situation where the preference…
Various medical and surgical units operate in a typical hospital and to treat their patients these units compete for infrastructure like operating rooms (OR) and ward beds. How that competition is regulated affects the capacity and output…
Since the early days of research in algorithms and complexity, the computation of stable matchings is a core topic. While in the classic setting the goal is to match up two agents (either from different "gender" (this is Stable Marriage) or…
We study the optimization of the stable marriage problem. All individuals attempt to optimize their own satisfaction, subject to mutually conflicting constraints. We find that the stable solutions are generally not the globally best…
In the Hospitals/Residents problem, every hospital has an upper quota that limits the number of residents assigned to it. While, in some applications, each hospital also has a lower quota for the number of residents it receives. In this…
We propose stochastic optimization methodologies for a staffing and capacity planning problem arising from home care practice. Specifically, we consider the perspective of a home care agency that must decide the number of caregivers to hire…
We study stable matchings that are robust to preference changes in the two-sided stable matching setting of Gale and Shapley [GS62]. Given two instances $A$ and $B$ on the same set of agents, a matching is said to be robust if it is stable…
We consider the single-item single-stocking location stochastic inventory system under a fixed ordering cost component. A long-standing problem is that of determining the structure of the optimal control policy when this system is subject…
We study the many-to-many bipartite matching problem in the presence of preferences where ties, as well as lower quotas, may appear on both sides of the bipartition. The input is a bipartite graph $G=(A \cup B, E)$, where each vertex in $A…
In a stable matching problem there are two groups of agents, with agents on one side having their individual preferences for agents on another side as a potential match. It is assumed silently that agents can freely and costlessly ``switch"…