Related papers: Strategic Behavior under Context Misalignment
Individuals use models to guide decisions, but many models are wrong. This paper studies which misspecified models are likely to persist when individuals also entertain alternative models. Consider an agent who uses her model to learn the…
In dynamic settings each economic agent's choices can be revealing of her private information. This elicitation via the rationalization of observable behavior depends each agent's perception of which payoff-relevant contingencies other…
How do incentive levels affect strategic behaviour? We address this with an experiment that separately identifies own- and opponent-incentive effects in two dominance-solvable games that differ in strategic complexity. Higher own incentives…
This paper examines the impact of cognitive biases on financial decision-making through a static Bayesian game framework. While traditional economic theory assumes fully rational investors, real-world choices are often shaped by loss…
We add the assumption that players know their opponents' payoff functions and rationality to a model of non-equilibrium learning in signaling games. Agents are born into player roles and play against random opponents every period.…
While game theory has been transformative for decision-making, the assumptions made can be overly restrictive in certain instances. In this work, we investigate some of the underlying assumptions of rationality, such as mutual consistency…
We extend the formalism of Conjectural Variations games to Stackelberg games involving multiple leaders and a single follower. To solve these nonconvex games, a common assumption is that the leaders compute their strategies having perfect…
We introduce a set-valued solution concept, M equilibrium, to capture empirical regularities from over half a century of game-theory experiments. We show M equilibrium serves as a meta theory for various models that hitherto were considered…
We introduce the notion of regularized Bayesian best response (RBBR) learning dynamic in heterogeneous population games. We obtain such a dynamic via perturbation by an arbitrary lower semicontinuous, strongly convex regularizer in Bayesian…
Ensuring robust decision-making in multi-agent systems is challenging when agents have distinct, possibly conflicting objectives and lack full knowledge of each other's strategies. This is apparent in safety-critical applications such as…
Social relationships are known to shape human behavior, yet when and how social ties influence strategic cognition remains unclear. We adopt a dual-measure approach that combines observed gameplay behavior with elicitation of…
The paper is devoted to a generalization of static and dynamic mathematical models of behavior with explicitly stated reflexive models of agents' decision-making. Reflexion is considered as agent's beliefs about nature, opponents' beliefs…
Coordination games admit two types of equilibria: pure equilibria, where all players successfully coordinate their actions, and mixed equilibria, where players frequently experience miscoordination. The existing literature shows that under…
Justification theory is a unifying semantic framework. While it has its roots in non-monotonic logics, it can be applied to various areas in computer science, especially in explainable reasoning; its most central concept is a justification:…
In everyday life, we frequently make coarse-grained judgments. When we say that Olivia and Noah excel in mathematics, we disregard the specific differences in their mathematical abilities. Similarly, when we claim that a particular…
In game theory, a trusted mediator acting on behalf of the players can enable the attainment of correlated equilibria, which may provide better payoffs than those available from the Nash equilibria alone. We explore the approach of…
Coordination games with explicit spatial or relational structure are of interest to economists, ecologists, sociologists, and others studying emergent global properties in collective behavior. When assemblies of individuals seek to…
Rule based reasoning (RBR) and case based reasoning (CBR) have emerged as two important and complementary reasoning methodologies in artificial intelligence (Al). For problem solving in complex, real world situations, it is useful to…
The combination of the Bayesian game and learning has a rich history, with the idea of controlling a single agent in a system composed of multiple agents with unknown behaviors given a set of types, each specifying a possible behavior for…
A way to simulate the basic interactions between two individuals with different opinions, in the context of strategic game theory, is proposed. Various games are considered, which produce different kinds of opinion formation dynamics.…