Related papers: On Binary Networked Public Goods Game with Altruis…
We study the open question of how players learn to play a social optimum pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) through repeated interactions in general-sum coordination games. A social optimum of a game is the stable Pareto-optimal state…
Addressing the question of how to achieve optimal decision-making under risk and uncertainty is crucial for enhancing the capabilities of artificial agents that collaborate with or support humans. In this work, we address this question in…
Two-player complete-information game trees are perhaps the simplest possible setting for studying general-sum games and the computational problem of finding equilibria. These games admit a simple bottom-up algorithm for finding subgame…
In recent work by Bramoull\'{e} and Kranton, a model for the provision of public goods on a network was presented and relations between equilibria of such a game and properties of the network were established. This model was further…
Games with incomplete preferences are an important model for studying rational decision-making in scenarios where players face incomplete information about their preferences and must contend with incomparable outcomes. We study the problem…
We study stable matching problems in networks where players are embedded in a social context, and may incorporate friendship relations or altruism into their decisions. Each player is a node in a social network and strives to form a good…
The decisions that human beings make to allocate time has significant bearing on economic output and to the sustenance of social networks. The time allocation problem motivates our formal analysis of the resource allocation game, where…
In this work, we investigate the distributed generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) seeking problems for $N$-coalition games with inequality constraints. First, we study the scenario where each agent in a coalition has full information of all…
In a network game, players interact over a network and the utility of each player depends on his own action and on an aggregate of his neighbours' actions. Many real world networks of interest are asymmetric and involve a large number of…
The dense deployment of small-cell base stations in HetSNets requires efficient resource allocation techniques. More precisely, the problem of associating users to SBSs must be revised and carefully studied. This problem is NP-hard and…
A repeated network game where agents have quadratic utilities that depend on information externalities -- an unknown underlying state -- as well as payoff externalities -- the actions of all other agents in the network -- is considered.…
This paper addresses the problem of distributed online generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) learning for multi-cluster games with delayed feedback information. Specifically, each agent in the game is assumed to be informed a sequence of local…
We complete the characterization of the computational complexity of equilibrium in public goods games on graphs. In this model, each vertex represents an agent deciding whether to produce a public good, with utility defined by a…
We propose a new class of games, called Multi-Games (MG), in which a given number of players play a fixed number of basic games simultaneously. In each round of the MG, each player will have a specific set of weights, one for each basic…
Public goods games represent insightful settings for studying incentives for individual agents to make contributions that, while costly for each of them, benefit the wider society. In this work, we adopt the perspective of a central planner…
Motivated by applications in social networks, peer-to-peer and overlay networks, we define and study the Bounded Budget Connection (BBC) game - we have a collection of n players or nodes each of whom has a budget for purchasing links; each…
Best Response Dynamics (BRD) is a class of strategy updating rules to find Pure Nash Equilibria (PNE) in a game. At each step, a player is randomly picked, and the player switches to a "best response" strategy based on the strategies chosen…
We study strategic interaction in linear-quadratic network games where agents act on subjective, misspecified models of their environment. Agents observe noisy aggregate signals generated by local network externalities and interpret them…
We develop a scheme based on active learning to compute equilibria in a generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP). Specifically, an external observer (or entity), with little knowledge on the multi-agent process at hand, collects sensible…
We consider a class of interdependent security games on networks where each node chooses a personal level of security investment. The attack probability experienced by a node is a function of her own investment and the investment by her…