Related papers: Auctioning Multiple Goods without Priors
Auctions via social network, pioneered by Li et al. (2017), have been attracting considerable attention in the literature of mechanism design for auctions. However, no known mechanism has satisfied strategy-proofness, non-deficit,…
We study the problem of expert advice under partial bandit feedback setting and create a sequential minimax optimal algorithm. Our algorithm works with a more general partial monitoring setting, where, in contrast to the classical bandit…
Sequential posted pricing auctions are popular because of their simplicity in practice and their tractability in theory. A usual assumption in their study is that the Bayesian prior distributions of the buyers are known to the seller, while…
For selling a single item to agents with independent but non-identically distributed values, the revenue optimal auction is complex. With respect to it, Hartline and Roughgarden (2009) showed that the approximation factor of the…
We study individual rational, Pareto optimal, and incentive compatible mechanisms for auctions with heterogeneous items and budget limits. For multi-dimensional valuations we show that there can be no deterministic mechanism with these…
This paper studies a joint design problem where a seller can design both the signal structures for the agents to learn their values, and the allocation and payment rules for selling the item. In his seminal work, Myerson (1981) shows how to…
The existing literature on optimal auctions focuses on optimizing the expected revenue of the seller, and is appropriate for risk-neutral sellers. In this paper, we identify good mechanisms for risk-averse sellers. As is standard in the…
Existing auto-bidding algorithms in digital advertising often treat the value of an ad opportunity as the revenue obtained when an ad is shown and/or clicked, and bid accordingly. This can lead to wasteful spending because the true value is…
In this paper, we investigate the problem about how to bid in repeated contextual first price auctions. We consider a single bidder (learner) who repeatedly bids in the first price auctions: at each time $t$, the learner observes a context…
Since economic mechanisms are often applied to very different instances of the same problem, it is desirable to identify mechanisms that work well in a wide range of circumstances. We pursue this goal for a position auction setting and…
I study the optimal allocation of positional goods in the presence of externalities arising from consumers' concerns about relative consumption. Applications include luxury goods, priority services, education, and organizational…
We study the optimal behavior of a bidder in a real-time auction subject to the requirement that a specified collections of heterogeneous items be acquired within given time constraints. The problem facing this bidder is cast as a…
We investigate online pricing in two-sided markets where a platform repeatedly posts prices based on binary accept/reject feedback to maximize gains-from-trade (GFT) or profit. We characterize the regret achievable across three mechanism…
Resource distribution is a fundamental problem in economic and policy design, particularly when demand and supply are not naturally aligned. Without regulation, wealthier individuals may monopolize this resource, leaving the needs of others…
A line of recent work provides welfare guarantees of simple combinatorial auction formats, such as selling m items via simultaneous second price auctions (SiSPAs) (Christodoulou et al. 2008, Bhawalkar and Roughgarden 2011, Feldman et al.…
Aiming to overcome some of the limitations of worst-case analysis, the recently proposed framework of "algorithms with predictions" allows algorithms to be augmented with a (possibly erroneous) machine-learned prediction that they can use…
Many auction settings implicitly or explicitly require that bidders are treated equally ex-ante. This may be because discrimination is philosophically or legally impermissible, or because it is practically difficult to implement or…
We study a model of auction design where a seller is selling a set of objects to a set of agents who can be assigned no more than one object. Each agent's preference over (object, payment) pair need not be quasilinear. If the domain…
Algorithmic Mechanism Design attempts to marry computation and incentives, mainly by leveraging monetary transfers between designer and selfish agents involved. This is principally because in absence of money, very little can be done to…
We study the problem of designing optimal auctions under restrictions on the set of permissible allocations. In addition to allowing us to restrict to deterministic mechanisms, we can also indirectly model non-additive valuations. We prove…