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Schelling games model the wide-spread phenomenon of residential segregation in metropolitan areas from a game-theoretic point of view. In these games agents of different types each strategically select a node on a given graph that models…
Schelling games use a game-theoretic approach to study the phenomenon of residential segregation as originally modeled by Schelling. Inspired by the recent increase in the number of people and businesses preferring and promoting diversity,…
Residential segregation is a wide-spread phenomenon that can be observed in almost every major city. In these urban areas residents with different racial or socioeconomic background tend to form homogeneous clusters. Schelling's famous…
We study a recently introduced class of strategic games that is motivated by and generalizes Schelling's well-known residential segregation model. These games are played on undirected graphs, with the set of agents partitioned into multiple…
We introduce the class of modified Schelling games in which there are different types of agents who occupy the nodes of a location graph; agents of the same type are friends, and agents of different types are enemies. Every agent is…
In most major cities and urban areas, residents form homogeneous neighborhoods along ethnic or socioeconomic lines. This phenomenon is widely known as residential segregation and has been studied extensively. Fifty years ago, Schelling…
We consider strategic games that are inspired by Schelling's model of residential segregation. In our model, the agents are partitioned into k types and need to select locations on an undirected graph. Agents can be either stubborn, in…
Schelling's segregation model is a landmark model in sociology. It shows the counter-intuitive phenomenon that residential segregation between individuals of different groups can emerge even when all involved individuals are tolerant.…
Schelling's famous model of segregation assumes agents of different types who would like to be located in neighborhoods having at least a certain fraction of agents of the same type. We consider natural generalizations that allow for the…
Recently, strategic games inspired by Schelling's influential model of residential segregation have been studied in the TCS and AI literature. In these games, agents of k different types occupy the nodes of a network topology aiming to…
We consider a class of jump games in which agents of different types occupy the nodes of a graph aiming to maximize the variety of types in their neighborhood. In particular, each agent derives a utility equal to the number of types…
The strategic selection of resources by selfish agents has long been a key area of research, with Resource Selection Games and Congestion Games serving as prominent examples. In these traditional frameworks, agents choose from a set of…
The phenomenon of residential segregation was captured by Schelling's famous segregation model where two types of agents are placed on a grid and an agent is content with her location if the fraction of her neighbors which have the same…
In the simplest game-theoretic formulation of Schelling's model of segregation on graphs, agents of two different types each select their own vertex in a given graph so as to maximize the fraction of agents of their type in their occupied…
The Schelling model is a simple agent based model that demonstrates how individuals' relocation decisions generate residential segregation in cities. Agents belong to one of two groups and occupy cells of rectangular space. Agents react to…
Segregation is widespread in all realms of human society. Several influential studies have argued that intolerance is not a prerequisite for a segregated society, and that segregation can arise even when people generally prefer diversity.…
Contrary to the widely believed hypothesis that larger, denser cities promote socioeconomic mixing, a recent study (Nilforoshan et al. 2023) reports the opposite behavior, i.e. more segregation. Here, we present a game-theoretic model that…
We model the dynamics of the Schelling model for agents described simply by a continuously distributed variable - wealth. Agents move to neighborhoods where their wealth is not lesser than that of some proportion of their neighbors, the…
We introduce a new class of network allocation games called graphical distance preservation games. Here, we are given a graph, called a topology, and a set of agents that need to be allocated to its vertices. Moreover, every agent has an…
Game theory has emerged as a fruitful paradigm for the design of networked multiagent systems. A fundamental component of this approach is the design of agents' utility functions so that their self-interested maximization results in a…