Related papers: Gate-Level Side-Channel Leakage Assessment with Ar…

Cache side-channel attacks extract secrets by examining how victim software accesses cache. To date, practical attacks on cryptosystems and media libraries are demonstrated under different scenarios, inferring secret keys and reconstructing…

Microarchitectural side channels expose unprotected software to information leakage attacks where a software adversary is able to track runtime behavior of a benign process and steal secrets such as cryptographic keys. As suggested by…

Secret-dependent timing behavior in cryptographic implementations has resulted in exploitable vulnerabilities, undermining their security. Over the years, numerous tools to automatically detect timing leakage or even to prove their absence…

Performing a comprehensive side-channel analysis evaluation of small embedded devices is a process known for its variability and complexity. In real-world experimental setups, the results are largely influenced by a huge amount of…

CPUs provide isolation mechanisms like virtualization and privilege levels to protect software. Yet these focus on architectural isolation while typically overlooking microarchitectural side channels, exemplified by Meltdown and Foreshadow.…

Side-channel attacks are important security challenges as they reveal sensitive information about on-chip activities. Among such attacks, the thermal side-channel has been shown to disclose the activities of key functional blocks and even…

In nanometer scaled CMOS devices significant increase in the subthreshold, the gate and the reverse biased junction band-to-band-tunneling (BTBT) leakage, results in the large increase of total leakage power in a logic circuit. Leakage…

Side-channel attacks have become a severe threat to the confidentiality of computer applications and systems. One popular type of such attacks is the microarchitectural attack, where the adversary exploits the hardware features to break the…

Randomized Benchmarking allows to efficiently and scalably characterize the average error of an unitary 2-design such as the Clifford group $\mathcal{C}$ on a physical candidate for quantum computation, as long as there are no…

Power analysis is a branch of side channel attacks where power consumption data is used as the side channel to attack the system. First using a device like an oscilloscope power traces are collected when the cryptographic device is doing…

Physical side channels emerge from the relation between internal computation or data with observable physical parameters of a chip. Previous works mostly focus on properties related to current consumption such as power consumption. The…

Timing side-channels are an important threat to cryptography that still needs to be addressed in implementations, and the advent of post-quantum cryptography raises this issue because the lattice-based schemes may produce secret-dependent…

Power side-channel attacks are a very effective cryptanalysis technique that can infer secret keys of security ICs by monitoring the power consumption. Since the emergence of practical attacks in the late 90s, they have been a major threat…

Side Channel Analysis (SCA) relaxes the black-box assumption of conventional cryptanalysis by incorporating physical measurements acquired during cryptographic operations. Electro-magnetic (EM) emissions of a chip during computations often…

Various side-channel attacks (SCAs) on ICs have been successfully demonstrated and also mitigated to some degree. In the context of 3D ICs, however, prior art has mainly focused on efficient implementations of classical SCA countermeasures.…

Side-channel attacks have become prominent attack surfaces in cyberspace. Attackers use the side information generated by the system while performing a task. Among the various side-channel attacks, cache side-channel attacks are leading as…

Side-channel attacks (SCAs), which infer secret information (for example secret keys) by exploiting information that leaks from the implementation (such as power consumption), have been shown to be a non-negligible threat to modern…

Side-channel attacks exploit unintended information leakage from system behavior and continue to pose serious privacy risks in modern platforms. Despite extensive prior work, side-channel analysis remains largely manual and fragmented,…

To meet the ever-growing need for performance in silicon devices, SoC providers have been increasingly relying on software-hardware cooperation. By controlling hardware resources such as power or clock management from the software,…

Side-channel attacks on mobile devices have gained increasing attention since their introduction in 2007. While traditional side-channel attacks, such as power analysis attacks and electromagnetic analysis attacks, required physical…