Related papers: Towards Data-Free Model Stealing in a Hard Label S…

We design differentially private learning algorithms that are agnostic to the learning model. Our algorithms are interactive in nature, i.e., instead of outputting a model based on the training data, they provide predictions for a set of…

The training phase of machine learning models is a delicate step, especially in cybersecurity contexts. Recent research has surfaced a series of insidious training-time attacks that inject backdoors in models designed for security…

Curating labeled training data has become the primary bottleneck in machine learning. Recent frameworks address this bottleneck with generative models to synthesize labels at scale from weak supervision sources. The generative model's…

In many machine learning applications, labeled data is scarce and obtaining more labels is expensive. We introduce a new approach to supervising neural networks by specifying constraints that should hold over the output space, rather than…

An attack on deep learning systems where intelligent machines collaborate to solve problems could cause a node in the network to make a mistake on a critical judgment. At the same time, the security and privacy concerns of AI have…

Recent studies show that the state-of-the-art deep neural networks are vulnerable to model inversion attacks, in which access to a model is abused to reconstruct private training data of any given target class. Existing attacks rely on…

Deep Neural Networks are robust to minor perturbations of the learned network parameters and their minor modifications do not change the overall network response significantly. This allows space for model stealing, where a malevolent…

In security-sensitive applications, the success of machine learning depends on a thorough vetting of their resistance to adversarial data. In one pertinent, well-motivated attack scenario, an adversary may attempt to evade a deployed system…

Training deep networks with noisy labels leads to poor generalization and degraded accuracy due to overfitting to label noise. Existing approaches for learning with noisy labels often rely on the availability of a clean subset of data. By…

Learning with labels noise has gained significant traction recently due to the sensitivity of deep neural networks under label noise under common loss functions. Losses that are theoretically robust to label noise, however, often makes…

We consider the hard label based black box adversarial attack setting which solely observes predicted classes from the target model. Most of the attack methods in this setting suffer from impractical number of queries required to achieve a…

In a backdoor attack, an adversary injects corrupted data into a model's training dataset in order to gain control over its predictions on images with a specific attacker-defined trigger. A typical corrupted training example requires…

We investigate whether model extraction can be used to "steal" the weights of sequential recommender systems, and the potential threats posed to victims of such attacks. This type of risk has attracted attention in image and text…

Deep neural networks and other machine learning systems, despite being extremely powerful and able to make predictions with high accuracy, are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. We proposed the DeltaBound attack: a novel, powerful attack in…

An off-the-shelf model as a commercial service could be stolen by model stealing attacks, posing great threats to the rights of the model owner. Model fingerprinting aims to verify whether a suspect model is stolen from the victim model,…

Machine learning models are vulnerable to adversarial examples. For the black-box setting, current substitute attacks need pre-trained models to generate adversarial examples. However, pre-trained models are hard to obtain in real-world…

We quantitatively investigate how machine learning models leak information about the individual data records on which they were trained. We focus on the basic membership inference attack: given a data record and black-box access to a model,…

As the deployment of deep learning models continues to expand across industries, the threat of malicious incursions aimed at gaining access to these deployed models is on the rise. Should an attacker gain access to a deployed model, whether…

Deep learning models are vulnerable to adversarial examples, which can fool a target classifier by imposing imperceptible perturbations onto natural examples. In this work, we consider the practical and challenging decision-based black-box…

Recent work has demonstrated the successful extraction of training data from generative language models. However, it is not evident whether such extraction is feasible in text classification models since the training objective is to predict…