Related papers: A Stackelberg game for incentive-based demand resp…
An important scenario for smart grids which encompass distributed electrical networks is given by the simultaneous presence of aggregators and individual consumers. In this work, an aggregator is seen as an entity (a coalition) which is…
Facing the dilemma of growing energy demand and mitigating carbon emissions, this paper proposes an energy sharing mechanism based on virtual federated prosumers (VFPs) with budget allocation for joint electricity and carbon market to…
Caching in wireless device-to-device (D2D) networks can be utilized to offload data traffic during peak times. However, the design of incentive mechanisms is challenging due to the heterogeneous preference and selfish nature of user…
We study a recommendation system where sellers compete for visibility by strategically offering commissions to a platform that optimally curates a ranked menu of items and their respective prices for each customer. Customers interact…
Demand Response (DR) is a program designed to match supply and demand by modifying consumption profile. Some of these programs are based on economic incentives, in which, a user is paid to reduce his energy requirements according to an…
The wide deployment of distributed renewable energy sources and electric vehicles can help mitigate climate crisis. This necessitates new business models in the power sector to hedge against uncertainties while imposing a strong coupling…
Market power exercise in the electricity markets distorts market prices and diminishes social welfare. Many markets have implemented market power mitigation processes to eliminate the impact of such behavior. The design of mitigation…
With the advent of prosumers, the traditional centralized operation may become impracticable due to computational burden, privacy concerns, and conflicting interests. In this paper, an energy sharing mechanism is proposed to accommodate…
As pressures to decarbonize the electricity grid increase, the grid edge is witnessing a rapid adoption of distributed and renewable generation. As a result, traditional methods for reactive power management and compensation may become…
This paper explores the economic interactions within modern crowdsourcing markets. In these markets, employers issue requests for tasks, platforms facilitate the recruitment of crowd workers, and workers complete tasks for monetary rewards.…
In the electricity market, it is quite common that the market participants make "selfish" strategies to harvest the maximum profits for themselves, which may cause the social benefit loss and impair the sustainability of the society in the…
With the rapidly increased penetration of renewable generations, incentive-based demand side management (DSM) shows great value on alleviating the uncertainty and providing flexibility for microgrid. However, how to price those demand…
This paper investigates energy efficiency for two-tier femtocell networks through combining game theory and stochastic learning. With the Stackelberg game formulation, a hierarchical reinforcement learning framework is applied to study the…
Peer-to-peer trading in energy networks is expected to be exclusively conducted by the prosumers of the network with negligible influence from the grid. This raises the critical question: how can enough prosumers be encouraged to…
A smart grid connects wind or solar or storage farms, fossil fuel plants, industrialor commercial loads, or load serving entities, modeled as stochastic dynamical systems. In each time period, they consume or supply electrical energy, with…
The integration of microgrids that depend on the renewable distributed energy resources with the current power systems is a critical issue in the smart grid. In this paper, we propose a non-cooperative game-theoretic framework to study the…
Many smart grid frameworks, such as demand response programs, require accurate information about consumers' parameters (e.g., flexibility) at the aggregator side to optimize grid operations. Existing works typically rely on perfect…
We consider an N-player hierarchical game in which the i-th player's objective comprises of an expectation-valued term, parametrized by rival decisions, and a hierarchical term. Such a framework allows for capturing a broad range of…
We introduce and study incentive equilibria for multi-player meanpayoff games. Incentive equilibria generalise well-studied solution concepts such as Nash equilibria and leader equilibria (also known as Stackelberg equilibria). Recall that…
The growing share of proactive actors in the electricity markets calls for more attention on prosumers and more support for their decision-making under decentralized electricity markets. In view of the changing paradigm, it is crucial to…