Related papers: Axiomatic Characterizations of Draft Rules
Preferences, fundamental in all forms of strategic behavior and collective decision-making, in their raw form, are an abstract ordering on a set of alternatives. Agents, we assume, revise their preferences as they gain more information…
In frequently repeated matching scenarios, individuals may require diversification in their choices. Therefore, when faced with a set of potential outcomes, each individual may have an ideal lottery over outcomes that represents their…
The Assignment problem is a fundamental and well-studied problem in the intersection of Social Choice, Computational Economics and Discrete Allocation. In the Assignment problem, a group of agents expresses preferences over a set of items,…
In the assignment problem, a set of items must be allocated to unit-demand agents who express ordinal preferences (rankings) over the items. In the assignment problem with priorities, agents with higher priority are entitled to their…
Graph games and Markov decision processes (MDPs) are standard models in reactive synthesis and verification of probabilistic systems with nondeterminism. The class of $\omega$-regular winning conditions; e.g., safety, reachability,…
Picking sequences are well-established methods for allocating indivisible goods. Among the various picking sequences, recursively balanced picking sequences -- whereby each agent picks one good in every round -- are notable for guaranteeing…
Voting is the aggregation of individual preferences in order to select a winning alternative. Selection of a winner is accomplished via a voting rule, e.g., rank-order voting, majority rule, plurality rule, approval voting. Which voting…
We provide optimal solutions to an institution that has distributional objectives when choosing from a set of applications based on merit (or priority). For example, in college admissions, administrators may want to admit a diverse class in…
A matching game is a cooperative profit game defined on an edge-weighted graph, where the players are the vertices and the profit of a coalition is the maximum weight of matchings in the subgraph induced by the coalition. A population…
Rationing of healthcare resources has emerged as an important issue, which has been discussed by medical experts, policy-makers, and the general public. We consider a rationing problem where medical units are to be allocated to patients.…
Admissible strategies, i.e. those that are not dominated by any other strategy, are a typical rationality notion in game theory. In many classes of games this is justified by results showing that any strategy is admissible or dominated by…
A new axiom for rules for claims problems is introduced. It strengthens a condition studied in supply chain literature, which forces rules to disincentivize order inflation under capacity allocation and retail competition. The relevance of…
In this paper, we present axiomatic characterizations of some simple risk-sharing (RS) rules, such as the uniform, the mean-proportional and the covariance-based linear RS rules. These characterizations make it easier to understand the…
Allocating indivisible items among a set of agents is a frequently studied discrete optimization problem. In the setting considered in this work, the agents' preferences over the items are assumed to be identical. We consider a very recent…
We construct several definitions of imbalance and playability, both of which are related to the existence of dominated strategies. Specifically, a maximally balanced game and a playable game cannot have dominated strategies for any player.…
We consider the problem of dividing limited resources to individuals arriving over $T$ rounds. Each round has a random number of individuals arrive, and individuals can be characterized by their type (i.e. preferences over the different…
In multiplayer games with sequential decision-making, self-interested players form dynamic coalitions to achieve most-preferred temporal goals beyond their individual capabilities. We introduce a novel procedure to synthesize strategies…
We study the design of optimal incentives in sequential processes. To do so, we consider a basic and fundamental model in which an agent initiates a value-creating sequential process through costly investment with random success. If…
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods among a set of agents in a fair and efficient manner. An allocation is said to be fair if it is envy-free up to one good (EF1), which means that each agent prefers its own bundle…
We study the classic divide-and-choose method for equitably allocating divisible goods between two players who are rational, self-interested Bayesian agents. The players have additive values for the goods. The prior distributions on those…