Related papers: Axiomatic Characterizations of Draft Rules
We characterize the optimal reward functions (scoring rules) that incentivize an agent to acquire information and report it truthfully to the principal. The optimal scoring rules let the agent make a simple binary bet in single-dimensional…
A tournament on $n$ agents is a complete oriented graph with the agents as vertices and edges that describe the win-loss outcomes of the $\binom{n}{2}$ matches played between each pair of agents. The winner of a tournament is determined by…
New fairness notions aligned with the merit principle are proposed for designing exchange rules. We show that for an obviously strategy-proof, efficient and individually rational rule, (i) an agent receives her favorite object when others…
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to groups of agents. Agents in the same group share the same set of goods even though they may have different preferences. Previous work has focused on unanimous fairness, in which…
We study a game-theoretic variant of the maximum circulation problem. In a flow allocation game, we are given a directed flow network. Each node is a rational agent and can strategically allocate any incoming flow to the outgoing edges.…
Envy-freeness is a standard benchmark of fairness in resource allocation. Since it cannot always be satisfied when the resource consists of indivisible items even when there are two agents, the relaxations envy-freeness up to one item (EF1)…
We investigate multi-round team competitions between two teams, where each team selects one of its players simultaneously in each round and each player can play at most once. The competition defines an extensive-form game with perfect…
Random serial dictatorship (RSD) is a randomized assignment rule that - given a set of $n$ agents with strict preferences over $n$ houses - satisfies equal treatment of equals, ex post efficiency, and strategyproofness. For $n \le 3$,…
We investigate the problem of random assignment of indivisible goods, in which each agent has an ordinal preference and a constraint. Our goal is to characterize the conditions under which there always exists a random assignment that…
In the problem of allocating a single non-disposable commodity among agents whose preferences are single-peaked, we study a weakening of strategy-proofness called not obvious manipulability (NOM). If agents are cognitively limited, then NOM…
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods between groups of agents using the recently introduced relaxations of envy-freeness. We consider the existence of fair allocations under different assumptions on the valuations of…
We study the effects of randomness on competitions based on an elementary random process in which there is a finite probability that a weaker team upsets a stronger team. We apply this model to sports leagues and sports tournaments, and…
In social choice theory, anonymity (all agents being treated equally) and neutrality (all alternatives being treated equally) are widely regarded as ``minimal demands'' and ``uncontroversial'' axioms of equity and fairness. However, the ANR…
Proportional ranking rules aggregate approval-style preferences of agents into a collective ranking such that groups of agents with similar preferences are adequately represented. Motivated by the application of live Q&A platforms, where…
We study the fair allocation of indivisible items subject to conflict constraints. In this framework, the items are represented as the vertices of a graph, with edges corresponding to conflicts between pairs of items. Each agent is assigned…
Given the final ranking of a competition, how should the total prize endowment be allocated among the competitors? We study consistent prize allocation rules satisfying elementary solidarity and fairness principles. In particular, we…
We study the computational complexity of fairly allocating a set of indivisible items under externalities. In this recently-proposed setting, in addition to the utility the agent gets from their bundle, they also receive utility from items…
We study a resource allocation setting where $m$ discrete items are to be divided among $n$ agents with additive utilities, and the agents' utilities for individual items are drawn at random from a probability distribution. Since common…
We consider the problem of allocating indivisible objects to agents when agents have strict preferences over objects. There are inherent trade-offs between competing notions of efficiency, fairness and incentives in assignment mechanisms.…
We consider the discrete assignment problem in which agents express ordinal preferences over objects and these objects are allocated to the agents in a fair manner. We use the stochastic dominance relation between fractional or randomized…