Related papers: Interdependent Public Projects
In this paper, we take a mechanism design approach to optimal assignment problems with asymmetrically informed buyers. In addition, the surplus generated by an assignment of a buyer to a seller may be adversely affected by externalities…
We show that every universally truthful randomized mechanism for combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations that provides $m^{\frac 1 2 -\epsilon}$ approximation to the social welfare and uses value queries only must use…
The cooperation mechanism of indirect reciprocity has been studied by making multiple variations of its parts. This research proposes a new variant of Nowak and Sigmund model, focused on agents' attitude; it is called Individualistic…
Research on promoting cooperation among autonomous, self-regarding agents has often focused on the bi-objective optimisation problem: minimising the total incentive cost while maximising the frequency of cooperation. However, the optimal…
Based on the observation that many existing discrete choice models admit a welfare function of utilities whose gradient gives the choice probability vector, we propose a new representation of discrete choice model which we call the…
We study the mechanism design problem of selling $k$ items to unit-demand buyers with private valuations for the items. A buyer either participates directly in the auction or is represented by an intermediary, who represents a subset of…
We study the power of item-pricing as a tool for approximately optimizing social welfare in a combinatorial market. We consider markets with $m$ indivisible items and $n$ buyers. The goal is to set prices to the items so that, when agents…
We introduce the study of designing allocation mechanisms for fairly allocating indivisible goods in settings with interdependent valuation functions. In our setting, there is a set of goods that needs to be allocated to a set of agents…
We study revenue maximization in settings where agents' values are interdependent: each agent receives a signal drawn from a correlated distribution and agents' values are functions of all of the signals. We introduce a variant of the…
We study fair division of indivisible goods in a single-parameter environment. In particular, we develop truthful social welfare maximizing mechanisms for fairly allocating indivisible goods. Our fairness guarantees are in terms of solution…
Valuation networks have been proposed as graphical representations of valuation-based systems (VBSs). The VBS framework is able to capture many uncertainty calculi including probability theory, Dempster-Shafer's belief-function theory,…
The instrumental variable (IV) design is a common approach to address hidden confounding bias. For validity, an IV must impact the outcome only through its association with the treatment. In addition, IV identification has required a…
When making a decision as a group, there are two primary paradigms: aggregating preferences (e.g. voting, mechanism design) and aggregating information (e.g. discussion, consulting, forecasting). Almost all formally-studied group…
A common objective in mechanism design is to choose the outcome (for example, allocation of resources) that maximizes the sum of the agents' valuations, without introducing incentives for agents to misreport their preferences. The class of…
We consider the problem of designing truthful auctions, when the bidders' valuations have a public and a private component. In particular, we consider combinatorial auctions where the valuation of an agent $i$ for a set $S$ of items can be…
In standard fair division models, we assume that all agents are selfish. However, in many scenarios, division of resources has a direct impact on the whole group or even society. Therefore, we study fair allocations of indivisible items…
We study social welfare in one-sided matching markets where the goal is to efficiently allocate n items to n agents that each have a complete, private preference list and a unit demand over the items. Our focus is on allocation mechanisms…
We study the problem of a seller dynamically pricing $d$ distinct types of indivisible goods, when faced with the online arrival of unit-demand buyers drawn independently from an unknown distribution. The goods are not in limited supply,…
Interactive partially observable Markov decision processes (I-POMDP) provide a formal framework for planning for a self-interested agent in multiagent settings. An agent operating in a multiagent environment must deliberate about the…
Recommendation systems (RSs) are increasingly used to guide job seekers on online platforms, yet the algorithms currently deployed are typically optimized for predictive objectives such as clicks, applications, or hires, rather than job…