Related papers: The comparative statics of persuasion
This paper analyzes a dynamic interaction between a fully rational, privately informed sender and a boundedly rational, uninformed receiver with memory constraints. The sender controls the flow of information, while the receiver designs a…
In this paper we discuss contrastive explanations for formal argumentation - the question why a certain argument (the fact) can be accepted, whilst another argument (the foil) cannot be accepted under various extension-based semantics. The…
Contrastive learning is a popular form of self-supervised learning that encourages augmentations (views) of the same input to have more similar representations compared to augmentations of different inputs. Recent attempts to theoretically…
In order to make argumentation-based inference contestable, it is crucial to explain what changes can achieve a desired (instead of the contested) inference result. To this end, we introduce strength change explanations for quantitative…
Causal discovery, the problem of inferring the direction of causality, is generally ill-posed. We use the language of structural causal models (SCM) to show that assuming that the causal relations are acyclic and invariant across multiple…
Trajectories in human aimed movements are inherently variable. Using the concept of positional variance profiles, such trajectories are shown to be decomposable into two phases: In a first phase, the variance of the limb position over many…
We introduce a new formal model -- based on the mathematical construct of sheaves -- for representing contradictory information in textual sources. This model has the advantage of letting us (a) identify the causes of the inconsistency; (b)…
This paper characterizes convex information costs using an axiomatic approach. We employ mixture convexity and sub-additivity, which capture the idea that producing "balanced" outputs is less costly than producing ``extreme'' ones. Our…
We consider a sender-receiver game in which the receiver's action is binary and the sender's preferences are state-independent. The state is multidimensional. The receiver can select one dimension of the state to check (i.e., observe)…
Motivated by information sharing in online platforms, we study repeated persuasion between a sender and a stream of receivers where at each time, the sender observes a payoff-relevant state drawn independently and identically from an…
We examine information structure design, also called "persuasion" or "signaling", in the presence of a constraint on the amount of communication. We focus on the fundamental setting of bilateral trade, which in its simplest form involves a…
Lagrangian duality underlies both classical and modern mechanism design. In particular, the dual perspective often permits simple and detail-free characterizations of optimal and approximately optimal mechanisms. This paper applies this…
We study monotone persuasion in the linear case, where posterior distributions over states are summarized by their mean. We solve the two leading cases where optimal unrestricted signals can be nonmonotone. First, if the objective is…
Decisions in organizations are about evaluating alternatives and choosing the one that would best serve organizational goals. To the extent that the evaluation of alternatives could be formulated as a predictive task with appropriate…
We present a model that investigates preference evolution with endogenous matching. In the short run, individuals' subjective preferences influence partner selection and behavior in strategic interactions, which affect their material…
Confirmation bias is a cognitive bias that adversely affects management decisions, and mathematical modelling is an aid to its detailed understanding. Bias in opinion update about the value of a parameter is modelled here assuming that…
In recommendation literature, explainability and fairness are becoming two prominent perspectives to consider. However, prior works have mostly addressed them separately, for instance by explaining to consumers why a certain item was…
We study a dynamic game where an expert sends probabilistic forecasts to a decision-maker. The decision-maker verifies these forecasts using a calibration test based on past data. How should the expert send forecasts to maximize her payoff…
We introduce a class of learning problems where the agent is presented with a series of tasks. Intuitively, if there is relation among those tasks, then the information gained during execution of one task has value for the execution of…
Roommate problems with convex preferences always have stable matchings. Efficiency and individual rationality are, moreover, compatible with strategyproofness in such convex roommate problems. Both of these results fail without the…