Related papers: The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice
The Deferred Acceptance (DA) algorithm is stable and strategy-proof, but can produce outcomes that are Pareto-inefficient for students, and thus several alternative mechanisms have been proposed to correct this inefficiency. However, we…
We consider priority-based school choice problems with farsighted students. We show that a singleton set consisting of the matching obtained from the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism is a farsighted stable set. However, the matching…
We study various novel complexity measures for two-sided matching mechanisms, applied to the two canonical strategyproof matching mechanisms, Deferred Acceptance (DA) and Top Trading Cycles (TTC). Our metrics are designed to capture the…
We conduct the first laboratory school choice experiment in which parents-the relevant decision makers in the field-are the experimental subjects. We compare Deferred Acceptance (DA) with two manipulable but potentially more efficient…
We study the classical probabilistic assignment problem, where finitely many indivisible objects are to be probabilistically or proportionally assigned among an equal number of agents. Each agent has an initial deterministic endowment and a…
This paper introduces a novel measurement of informational size to school choice problems, which inherits its ideas from Mount and Reiter (1974). This concept measures a matching mechanism's information size by counting the maximal relevant…
The Deferred Acceptance algorithm is a popular school allocation mechanism thanks to its strategy proofness. However, with application costs, strategy proofness fails, leading to an identification problem. In this paper, I address this…
Centralized assignment markets have historically relied on Deferred-Acceptance (DA) algorithms, which do not incorporate multiple objectives into the assignment. In this work, we propose an optimization-based many-to-one assignment…
A menu description exposes strategyproofness by presenting a mechanism to player $i$ in two steps. Step (1) uses others' reports to describe $i$'s menu of potential outcomes. Step (2) uses $i$'s report to select $i$'s favorite outcome from…
In a typical school choice application, the students have strict preferences over the schools while the schools have coarse priorities over the students based on their distance and their enrolled siblings. The outcome of a centralized…
The Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism can generate inefficient placements. Although Pareto-dominant mechanisms exist, it remains unclear which and how many students could improve. We characterize the set of unimprovable students and show…
A classic trade-off that school districts face when deciding which matching algorithm to use is that it is not possible to always respect both priorities and preferences. The student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) respects…
The stable matching problem sets the economic foundation of several practical applications ranging from school choice and medical residency to ridesharing and refugee placement. It is concerned with finding a matching between two disjoint…
In school choice, policymakers consolidate a district's objectives for a school into a priority ordering over students. They then face a trade-off between respecting these priorities and assigning students to more-preferred schools.…
The three most common school choice mechanisms are the Deferred Acceptance mechanism (DA), the classic Boston mechanism (BM), and a variant of the Boston mechanism where students automatically skip exhausted schools, which we call the…
In considering the college admissions problem, almost fifty years ago, Gale and Shapley came up with a simple abstraction based on preferences of students and colleges. They introduced the concept of stability and optimality; and proposed…
One-sided matching problems with ordinal preferences, such as hostel room allocation, are commonly solved using the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism, which guarantees Pareto-optimal (PO) outcomes. However, TTC does not yield a unique…
School choice is of great importance both in theory and practice. This paper studies the (student-optimal) top trading cycles mechanism (TTCM) in an axiomatic way. We introduce two new axioms: MBG (mutual best group)-quota-rationality and…
In school choice, students make decisions based on their expectations of particular schools' suitability, and the decision to gather information about schools is influenced by the acceptance odds determined by the mechanism in place. We…
We study the classical assignment problem with initial endowments in a probabilistic framework. In this setting, each agent initially owns an object and has strict preferences over the entire set of objects, and the goal is to reassign…