Related papers: Finding all stable matchings with assignment const…
In IWOCA 2019, Ruangwises and Itoh introduced stable noncrossing matchings, where participants of each side are aligned on each of two parallel lines, and no two matching edges are allowed to cross each other. They defined two stability…
We study the stable matching problem in non-bipartite graphs with incomplete but strict preference lists, where the edges have weights and the goal is to compute a stable matching of minimum or maximum weight. This problem is known to be…
Many two-sided matching markets, from labor markets to school choice programs, use a clearinghouse based on the applicant-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm, which is well known to be strategy-proof for the applicants. Nonetheless, a…
Gale and Shapley's stable assignment problem has been extensively studied, applied, and extended. In the context of school choice, mechanisms often aim at finding an assignment that is more favorable to students. We investigate two…
We say that an algorithm is stable if small changes in the input result in small changes in the output. This kind of algorithm stability is particularly relevant when analyzing and visualizing time-varying data. Stability in general plays…
We study the variant of the stable marriage problem in which the preferences of the agents are allowed to include indifferences. We present a mechanism for producing Pareto-stable matchings in stable marriage markets with indifferences that…
Fragment-based shape signature techniques have proven to be powerful tools for computer-aided drug design. They allow scientists to search for target molecules with some similarity to a known active compound. They do not require reference…
We study the optimization of the stable marriage problem. All individuals attempt to optimize their own satisfaction, subject to mutually conflicting constraints. We find that the stable solutions are generally not the globally best…
Given a text and a pattern over two types of symbols called constants and variables, the parameterized pattern matching problem is to find all occurrences of substrings of the text that the pattern matches by substituting a variable in the…
We study competitive equilibria in the classic Shapley-Shubik assignment model with indivisible goods and unit-demand buyers, with budget constraints: buyers can specify a maximum price they are willing to pay for each item, beyond which…
We introduce a new algorithm for finding stable matchings in multi-sided matching markets. Our setting is motivated by a PhD market of students, advisors, and co-advisors, and can be generalized to supply chain networks viewed as $n$-sided…
An instance $I$ of the Stable Matching Problem (SMP) is given by a bipartite graph with a preference list of neighbors for every vertex. A swap in $I$ is the exchange of two consecutive vertices in a preference list. A swap can be viewed as…
In this paper, we propose a new constraint, called shift-consistency, for solving matrix/tensor completion problems in the context of recommender systems. Our method provably guarantees several key mathematical properties: (1) satisfies a…
This paper develops an integer programming approach to two-sided many-to-one matching by investigating stable integral matchings of a fictitious market where each worker is divisible. We show that stable matchings exist in a discrete…
While the existence of a stable matching for the stable roommates problem possibly with incomplete preference lists (SRI) can be decided in polynomial time, SRI problems with some fairness criteria are intractable. Egalitarian SRI that…
The literature on centralized matching markets often assumes that a true preference of each player is known to herself and fixed, but empirical evidence casts doubt on its plausibility. To circumvent the problem, we consider evolutionary…
Maximizing monotone submodular functions under cardinality constraints is a classic optimization task with several applications in data mining and machine learning. In this paper we study this problem in a dynamic environment with…
Designing component-based constraint solvers is a complex problem. Some components are required, some are optional and there are interdependencies between the components. Because of this, previous approaches to solver design and…
We study the Stable Fixtures problem, a many-to-many generalisation of the classical non-bipartite Stable Roommates matching problem. Building on the foundational work of Tan on stable partitions, we extend his results to this significantly…
When computing stable matchings, it is usually assumed that the preferences of the agents in the matching market are fixed. However, in many realistic scenarios, preferences change over time. Consequently, an initially stable matching may…