Related papers: Resiliency of Nonlinear Control Systems to Stealth…

This paper quantifies the security of uncertain interconnected systems under stealthy data injection attacks. In particular, we consider a large-scale system composed of a certain subsystem interconnected with an uncertain subsystem, where…

Many autonomous control systems are frequently exposed to attacks, so methods for attack identification are crucial for a safe operation. To preserve the privacy of the subsystems and achieve scalability in large-scale systems,…

Malicious attacks on modern autonomous cyber-physical systems (CPSs) can leverage information about the system dynamics and noise characteristics to hide while hijacking the system toward undesired states. Given attacks attempting to hide…

Stealthy attacks on Industrial Control Systems can cause significant damage while evading detection. In this paper, instead of focusing on the detection of stealthy attacks, we aim to provide early warnings to operators, in order to avoid…

Attacks on Industrial Control Systems (ICS) can lead to significant physical damage. While offline safety and security assessments can provide insight into vulnerable system components, they may not account for stealthy attacks designed to…

We investigate resilient control strategies for linear systems under Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. By DoS attacks we mean interruptions of communication on measurement (sensor-to-controller) and/or control (controller-to-actuator)…

Motivated by the need to secure cyber-physical systems against attacks, we consider the problem of estimating the state of a noisy linear dynamical system when a subset of sensors is arbitrarily corrupted by an adversary. We propose a…

Cyber-physical systems can be subject to sensor attacks, e.g., sensor spoofing, leading to unsafe behaviors. This paper addresses this problem in the context of linear systems when an omniscient attacker can spoof several system sensors at…

We introduce the problem of learning-based attacks in a simple abstraction of cyber-physical systems---the case of a discrete-time, linear, time-invariant plant that may be subject to an attack that overrides the sensor readings and the…

This paper studies the vehicle bicycle model under three classes of stealthy cyber-attacks: replay attacks, zero dynamics attacks, and covert attacks. Using a system-theoretic framework, we analyze the feasibility and impact of these…

This article considers the design and analysis of multiple moving target defenses for recognizing and isolating attacks on cyber-physical systems. We consider attackers who perform integrity attacks on a set of sensors and actuators in a…

The increase in network connectivity has also resulted in several high-profile attacks on cyber-physical systems. An attacker that manages to access a local network could remotely affect control performance by tampering with sensor…

In this paper, we introduce a robust sensor design framework to provide "persuasion-based" defense in stochastic control systems against an unknown type attacker with a control objective exclusive to its type. For effective control, such an…

We propose a new defense mechanism against undetected infiltration into controllers in cyber-physical systems. To this end, we cautiously design the outputs of the sensors that monitor the state of the system. Different from the defense…

In this work, we investigate how to make use of model reduction techniques to identify the vulnerability of a closed-loop system, consisting of a plant and a supervisor, that might invite attacks. Here, the system vulnerability refers to…

Attacks in cyber-physical systems (CPS) which manipulate sensor readings can cause enormous physical damage if undetected. Detection of attacks on sensors is crucial to mitigate this issue. We study supervised regression as a means to…

We consider the problem of controller design for linear time-invariant cyber-physical systems (CPSs) controlled via networks. Specifically, we adopt the set-up that a controller has already been designed to stabilize the plant. However, the…

This paper presents a detection algorithm for sensor attacks and a resilient state estimation scheme for a class of uniformly observable nonlinear systems. An adversary is supposed to corrupt a subset of sensors with the possibly unbounded…

We study the optimal design of stealthy attacks against partially observed linear control systems. We first propose a novel likelihood-based detection mechanism derived from the innovation process, based on which we quantify stealthiness…

This paper considers the analysis and design of resilient/robust decentralized control systems. Specifically, we aim to assess how the pairing of sensors and actuators lead to architectures that are resilient to attacks/hacks for industrial…