Related papers: Nash Neural Networks : Inferring Utilities from Op…
We study a setting in which two players play a (possibly approximate) Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game, while a learner observes only their actions and has no knowledge of the equilibrium or the underlying game. A natural question is…
We provide a novel approach to achieving a desired outcome in a coordination game: the original 2x2 game is embedded in a 2x3 game where one of the players may use a third action. For a large set of payoff values only one of the Nash…
We consider multi-agent decision making where each agent optimizes its convex cost function subject to individual and coupling constraints. The constraint sets are compact convex subsets of a Euclidean space. To learn Nash equilibria, we…
Individual behaviors play an essential role in the dynamics of transmission of infectious diseases, including COVID--19. This paper studies a dynamic game model that describes the social distancing behaviors during an epidemic, assuming a…
In this tutorial, we provide an introduction to machine learning methods for finding Nash equilibria in games with large number of agents. These types of problems are important for the operations research community because of their…
Nash equilibrium is used as a model to explain the observed behavior of players in strategic settings. For example, in many empirical applications we observe player behavior, and the problem is to determine if there exist payoffs for the…
The decisions that human beings make to allocate time has significant bearing on economic output and to the sustenance of social networks. The time allocation problem motivates our formal analysis of the resource allocation game, where…
Nash equilibria are crucial for understanding game behavior and systems in economics, physics, biology, and computer science. A significant application arises from the connection between Nash equilibria and optimization problems . However,…
In this second part of our work, we study the steady state of the population and the social utility for the three dynamics SSD, NBRD and NRPM; which were introduced in the first part. We provide sufficient conditions on the network based on…
Reinforcement learning has been shown to be an effective strategy for automatically training policies for challenging control problems. Focusing on non-cooperative multi-agent systems, we propose a novel reinforcement learning framework for…
Autonomous artificial intelligence agents in negotiation systems must generate equitable utility allocations satisfying individual rationality (IR), ensuring each agent receives at least its outside option, and the Nash Bargaining Solution…
In this work, we introduce graphical modelsfor multi-player game theory, and give powerful algorithms for computing their Nash equilibria in certain cases. An n-player game is given by an undirected graph on n nodes and a set of n local…
This paper considers the problem of Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking in aggregative games, where the payoff function of each player depends on an aggregate of all players' actions. We present a distributed continuous time algorithm such that…
Consider a set of agents who play a network game repeatedly. Agents may not know the network. They may even be unaware that they are interacting with other agents in a network. Possibly, they just understand that their payoffs depend on an…
This paper addresses the matter of inequality in network formation games. We employ a quantity that we are calling the Nash Inequality Ratio (NIR), defined as the maximal ratio between the highest and lowest costs incurred to individual…
Learning problems commonly exhibit an interesting feedback mechanism wherein the population data reacts to competing decision makers' actions. This paper formulates a new game theoretic framework for this phenomenon, called "multi-player…
In multi-agent dynamic games, the Nash equilibrium state trajectory of each agent is determined by its cost function and the information pattern of the game. However, the cost and trajectory of each agent may be unavailable to the other…
In many game-theoretic settings, agents are challenged with taking decisions against the uncertain behavior exhibited by others. Often, this uncertainty arises from multiple sources, e.g., incomplete information, limited computation,…
One of the natural objectives of the field of the social networks is to predict agents' behaviour. To better understand the spread of various products through a social network arXiv:1105.2434 introduced a threshold model, in which the nodes…
We present new coordination mechanisms for scheduling selfish jobs on $m$ unrelated machines. A coordination mechanism aims to mitigate the impact of selfishness of jobs on the efficiency of schedules by defining a local scheduling policy…