Related papers: The Combinatorial Multi-Round Ascending Auction
Algorithmic Mechanism Design attempts to marry computation and incentives, mainly by leveraging monetary transfers between designer and selfish agents involved. This is principally because in absence of money, very little can be done to…
Revealed preference techniques are used to test whether a data set is compatible with rational behaviour. They are also incorporated as constraints in mechanism design to encourage truthful behaviour in applications such as combinatorial…
We consider a revenue-maximizing seller with a single item for sale to multiple buyers with i.i.d. valuations. Akbarpour and Li (2020) show that the only optimal, credible, strategyproof auction is the ascending price auction with reserves…
In this paper, we present a new model and two mechanisms for auctions in two-sided markets of buyers and sellers, where budget constraints are imposed on buyers. Our model incorporates polymatroidal environments, and is applicable to a wide…
Auctions have been employed as an effective framework for the management and the assignment of tasks in mobile crowdsensing (MCS). In auctions terminology, the clearance rate (CR) refers to the percentage of items that are sold over the…
We propose a combinatorial ascending auction that is "approximately" optimal, requiring minimal rationality to achieve this level of optimality, and is robust to strategic and distributional uncertainties. Specifically, the auction is…
In this paper, we propose an equilibrium pricing model in a dynamic multi-period stochastic framework with uncertain income streams. In an incomplete market, there exist two traded risky assets (e.g. stock/commodity and weather derivative)…
We consider the question of whether collusion among bidders (a "bidding ring") can be supported in equilibrium of unrepeated first-price auctions. Unlike previous work on the topic such as that by McAfee and McMillan [1992] and Marshall and…
We study buyer-optimal procurement mechanisms when quality is contractible. When some costs are borne by every participant of a procurement auction regardless of winning, the classic analysis should be amended. We show that an optimal…
We use valid inequalities (cuts) of the binary integer program for winner determination in a combinatorial auction (CA) as "artificial items" that can be interpreted intuitively and priced to generate Artificial Walrasian Equilibria. We…
In the standard single-dimensional model of position auctions, bidders agree on the relative values of the positions and each of them submits a single bid that is interpreted in terms of these values. Motivated by current practice in…
The paper proposes a parsimonious and flexible semiparametric quantile regression specification for asymmetric bidders within the independent private value framework. Asymmetry is parameterized using powers of a parent private value…
Recent spectrum auctions in the United Kingdom, and some proposals for future auctions of spectrum in the United States, are based on preliminary price discovery rounds, followed by calculation of final prices for the winning buyers. For…
Adversarial Risk Analysis (ARA) is an upcoming methodology that is considered to have advantages over the traditional decision theoretic and game theoretic approaches. ARA solutions for first-price sealed-bid (FPSB) auctions have been found…
We propose an empirical method to analyze data from first-price procurements where bidders are asymmetric in their risk-aversion (CRRA) coefficients and distributions of private costs. Our Bayesian approach evaluates the likelihood by…
Spectrum auctions are the primary mechanism through which governments allocate scarce radio frequencies, with outcomes that shape competition, coverage, and innovation in telecommunications markets. While traditional models of spectrum…
We study the design of iterative combinatorial auctions (ICAs). The main challenge in this domain is that the bundle space grows exponentially in the number of items. To address this, recent work has proposed machine learning (ML)-based…
Motivated by recent research on combinatorial markets with endowed valuations by (Babaioff et al., EC 2018) and (Ezra et al., EC 2020), we introduce a notion of perturbation stability in Combinatorial Auctions (CAs) and study the extend to…
Multi-unit auctions are a paradigmatic model, where a seller brings multiple units of a good, while several buyers bring monetary endowments. It is well known that Walrasian equilibria do not always exist in this model, however compelling…
We design an expected polynomial-time, truthful-in-expectation, (1-1/e)-approximation mechanism for welfare maximization in a fundamental class of combinatorial auctions. Our results apply to bidders with valuations that are m matroid rank…