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In multi-agent autonomous systems, deception is a fundamental concept which characterizes the exploitation of unbalanced information to mislead victims into choosing oblivious actions. This effectively alters the system's long term…
In the theory of multi-agent systems, deception refers to the strategic manipulation of information to influence the behavior of other agents, ultimately altering the long-term dynamics of the entire system. Recently, this concept has been…
In game theory, mechanism design is concerned with the design of incentives so that a desired outcome of the game can be achieved. In this paper, we study the design of incentives so that a desirable equilibrium is obtained, for instance,…
In game theory, mechanism design is concerned with the design of incentives so that a desired outcome of the game can be achieved. In this paper, we explore the concept of equilibrium design, where incentives are designed to obtain a…
Learning problems commonly exhibit an interesting feedback mechanism wherein the population data reacts to competing decision makers' actions. This paper formulates a new game theoretic framework for this phenomenon, called "multi-player…
The modelling of modern power markets requires the representation of the following main features: (i) a stochastic dynamic decision process, with uncertainties related to renewable production and fuel costs, among others; and (ii) a…
The distributed computation of Nash equilibria is assuming growing relevance in engineering where such problems emerge in the context of distributed control. Accordingly, we present schemes for computing equilibria of two classes of static…
Mechanism design is a well-established game-theoretic paradigm for designing games to achieve desired outcomes. This paper addresses a closely related but distinct concept, equilibrium design. Unlike mechanism design, the designer's…
In two-player zero-sum stochastic games, where two competing players make decisions under uncertainty, a pair of optimal strategies is traditionally described by Nash equilibrium and computed under the assumption that the players have…
In this paper, we apply the idea of fictitious play to design deep neural networks (DNNs), and develop deep learning theory and algorithms for computing the Nash equilibrium of asymmetric $N$-player non-zero-sum stochastic differential…
We study optimal behavior of energy producers under a CO_2 emission abatement program. We focus on a two-player discrete-time model where each producer is sequentially optimizing her emission and production schedules. The game-theoretic…
Probabilistic model checking for stochastic games enables formal verification of systems that comprise competing or collaborating entities operating in a stochastic environment. Despite good progress in the area, existing approaches focus…
In socio-technical multi-agent systems, deception exploits privileged information to induce false beliefs in "victims," keeping them oblivious and leading to outcomes detrimental to them or advantageous to the deceiver. We consider…
We introduce and study incentive equilibria for multi-player meanpayoff games. Incentive equilibria generalise well-studied solution concepts such as Nash equilibria and leader equilibria (also known as Stackelberg equilibria). Recall that…
In this paper, we propose a numerical methodology for finding the closed-loop Nash equilibrium of stochastic delay differential games through deep learning. These games are prevalent in finance and economics where multi-agent interaction…
We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between players; formally, in the games we consider, the payoff of a player has increasing differences between her own state and the empirical…
Two traditional paradigms are often used to describe the behavior of agents in multi-agent complex systems. In the first one, agents are considered to be fully rational and systems are seen as multi-player games. In the second one, agents…
We consider a 3-player game in the normal form, in which each player has two actions. We assume that the game is symmetric and repeated infinitely many times. At each stage players make their choices knowing only the average payoffs from…
Mechanism design is essentially reverse engineering of games and involves inducing a game among strategic agents in a way that the induced game satisfies a set of desired properties in an equilibrium of the game. Desirable properties for a…
Game theory provides a well-established framework for the analysis of concurrent and multi-agent systems. The basic idea is that concurrent processes (agents) can be understood as corresponding to players in a game; plays represent the…