Related papers: Optimal Correlated Equilibria in General-Sum Exten…
Generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) is a solution concept for complete information games, in which each player's objective function and feasible region depend on other players' actions. While numerical methods for finding GNE when players…
In game theory, mechanism design is concerned with the design of incentives so that a desired outcome of the game can be achieved. In this paper, we explore the concept of equilibrium design, where incentives are designed to obtain a…
We study the complexity of computing or approximating refinements of Nash equilibrium for a given finite n-player extensive form game of perfect recall (EFGPR), where n >= 3. Our results apply to a number of well-studied refinements,…
The designs of many large-scale systems today, from traffic routing environments to smart grids, rely on game-theoretic equilibrium concepts. However, as the size of an $N$-player game typically grows exponentially with $N$, standard game…
This paper considers a class of noncooperative games in which the feasible decision sets of all players are coupled together by a coupled inequality constraint. Adopting the variational inequality formulation of the game, we first introduce…
We study the problem of finding robust equilibria in multiplayer concurrent games with mean payoff objectives. A $(k,t)$-robust equilibrium is a strategy profile such that no coalition of size $k$ can improve the payoff of one its member by…
This paper studies a class of strongly monotone games involving non-cooperative agents that optimize their own time-varying cost functions. We assume that the agents can observe other agents' historical actions and choose actions that best…
This paper investigates repeated win-lose coordination games (WLC-games). We analyse which protocols are optimal for these games covering both the worst case and average case scenarios, i,e., optimizing the guaranteed and expected…
We study the problem of characterizing the set of games that are consistent with observed equilibrium play. Our contribution is to develop and analyze a new methodology based on convex optimization to address this problem for many classes…
The Nash Equilibrium (NE), one of the elegant and fundamental concepts in game theory, plays a crucial part within various fields, including engineering and computer science. However, efficiently computing an NE in normal-form games remains…
We examine the problem of efficiently learning coarse correlated equilibria (CCE) in polyhedral games, that is, normal-form games with an exponentially large number of actions per player and an underlying combinatorial structure. Prominent…
This paper aims to reduce the communication and computation costs of the Nash equilibrium seeking strategy for the $N$-coalition noncooperative games proposed in [1]. The objective is achieved in two manners: 1. An interference graph is…
It is well-known that for infinitely repeated games, there are computable strategies that have best responses, but no computable best responses. These results were originally proved for either specific games (e.g., Prisoner's dilemma), or…
Extensive-form games (EFGs) model finite sequential interactions between players. The amount of memory required to represent these games is the main bottleneck of algorithms for computing optimal strategies and the size of these strategies…
Several works have shown unconditional hardness (via integrality gaps) of computing equilibria using strong hierarchies of convex relaxations. Such results however only apply to the problem of computing equilibria that optimize a certain…
Regret minimization is a powerful tool for solving large-scale extensive-form games. State-of-the-art methods rely on minimizing regret locally at each decision point. In this work we derive a new framework for regret minimization on…
We study the computational complexity of finding Stackelberg Equilibria in general-sum games, where the set of pure strategies of the leader and the followers are exponentially large in a natrual representation of the problem. In…
Dynamic games are powerful tools to model multi-agent decision-making, yet computing Nash (generalized Nash) equilibria remains a central challenge in such settings. Complexity arises from tightly coupled optimality conditions, nested…
Extensive-form games (EFGs) provide a powerful framework for modeling sequential decision making, capturing strategic interaction under imperfect information, chance events, and temporal structure. Most positive algorithmic and theoretical…
We propose a simple yet rich model to extend the notions of Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria of strategic games to the quantum setting, in which we then study the relations between classical and quantum equilibria. Unlike the…