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The notion of optimality naturally arises in many areas of applied mathematics and computer science concerned with decision making. Here we consider this notion in the context of two formalisms used for different purposes and in different…
Imitating successful behavior is a natural and frequently applied approach to trust in when facing scenarios for which we have little or no experience upon which we can base our decision. In this paper, we consider such behavior in atomic…
We introduce a notion of subgames for stochastic timing games and the related notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium in possibly mixed strategies. While a good notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium for continuous-time games is not available…
Conventional noncooperative game theory hypothesizes that the joint strategy of a set of players in a game must satisfy an "equilibrium concept". All other joint strategies are considered impossible; the only issue is what equilibrium…
This paper investigates properties of Blackwell $\epsilon$-optimal strategies in zero-sum stochastic games when the adversary is restricted to stationary strategies, motivated by applications to robust Markov decision processes. For a class…
The goal of the thesis is to leverage fast graph algorithms and modern algorithmic techniques for problems in model checking and synthesis on graphs, MDPs, and game graphs. The results include symbolic algorithms, a well-known class of…
In common-interest stochastic games all players receive an identical payoff. Players participating in such games must learn to coordinate with each other in order to receive the highest-possible value. A number of reinforcement learning…
We study optimal equilibria in multi-player games. An equilibrium is optimal for a player, if her payoff is maximal. A tempting approach to solving this problem is to seek optimal Nash equilibria, the standard form of equilibria where no…
The paper studies the convergence properties of (continuous) best-response dynamics from game theory. Despite their fundamental role in game theory, best-response dynamics are poorly understood in many games of interest due to the…
We study deterministic games of infinite duration played on graphs and focus on the strategy complexity of quantitative objectives. Such games are known to admit optimal memoryless strategies over finite graphs, but require infinite-memory…
Successful algorithms have been developed for computing Nash equilibrium in a variety of finite game classes. However, solving continuous games -- in which the pure strategy space is (potentially uncountably) infinite -- is far more…
Two-player zero-sum "graph games" are a central model, which proceeds as follows. A token is placed on a vertex of a graph, and the two players move it to produce an infinite "play", which determines the winner or payoff of the game.…
We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between players; formally, in the games we consider, the payoff of a player has increasing differences between her own state and the empirical…
This paper addresses complexity problems in rational verification and synthesis for multi-player games played on weighted graphs, where the objective of each player is to minimize the cost of reaching a specific set of target vertices. In…
We study Recursive Concurrent Stochastic Games (RCSGs), extending our recent analysis of recursive simple stochastic games to a concurrent setting where the two players choose moves simultaneously and independently at each state. For…
Two-player win/lose games of infinite duration are involved in several disciplines including computer science and logic. If such a game has deterministic winning strategies, one may ask how simple such strategies can get. The answer may…
In a network game, players interact over a network and the utility of each player depends on his own action and on an aggregate of his neighbours' actions. Many real world networks of interest are asymmetric and involve a large number of…
We study the parallel Minority Game, where a group of agents, each having two choices, try to independently decide on a strategy such that they stay on minority between their own two choices. However, there are multiple such groups of…
We study a setting in which two players play a (possibly approximate) Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game, while a learner observes only their actions and has no knowledge of the equilibrium or the underlying game. A natural question is…
We consider two-player games played over finite state spaces for an infinite number of rounds. At each state, the players simultaneously choose moves; the moves determine a successor state. It is often advantageous for players to choose…