Related papers: Cooperative networks and Hodge-Shapley value
In Briata, Dall'Aglio and Fragnelli (2012), the authors introduce a cooperative game with transferable utility for allocating the gain of a collusion among completely risk-averse agents involved in the fair division procedure introduced by…
Multi-agent reinforcement learning is an area of rapid advancement in artificial intelligence and machine learning. One of the important questions to be answered is how to conduct credit assignment in a multi-agent system. There have been…
Every weighted tree corresponds naturally to a cooperative game that we call a "tree game"; it assigns to each subset of leaves the sum of the weights of the minimal subtree spanned by those leaves. In the context of phylogenetic trees, the…
This paper focuses on the fundamental challenge of partitioning input variables in attribution methods for Explainable AI, particularly in Shapley value-based approaches. Previous methods always compute attributions given a predefined…
We consider the problem of payoff division in indivisible coalitional games, where the value of the grand coalition is a natural number. This number represents a certain quantity of indivisible objects, such as parliamentary seats, kidney…
This work focuses on developing efficient post-hoc explanations for quantum AI algorithms. In classical contexts, the cooperative game theory concept of the Shapley value adapts naturally to post-hoc explanations, where it can be used to…
We study a cooperative game setting where the grand coalition may change since the initial players can invite more players. We focus on monotone games, i.e., adding more players to the grand coalition is not harmful. We model the invitation…
We study general-sum, multi-player stochastic games with transferable utility, motivated by settings where agents can use side payments to make cooperation individually rational. Building on the Harsanyi--Shapley (HS) value for normal-form…
In the classical context, the cooperative game theory concept of the Shapley value has been adapted for post hoc explanations of machine learning models. However, this approach does not easily translate to eXplainable Quantum ML (XQML).…
Big Boss Games represent a specific class of cooperative games where a single veto player, known as the Big Boss, plays a central role in determining resource allocation and maintaining coalition stability. In this paper, we introduce a…
We propose in this paper a coinvestment plan between several stakeholders of different types, namely a physical network owner, operating network nodes, e.g. a network operator or a tower company, and a set of service providers willing to…
Originally introduced in cooperative game theory, Shapley values have become a very popular tool to explain machine learning predictions. Based on Shapley's fairness axioms, every input (feature component) gets a credit how it contributes…
Fair cost allocation in community microgrids remains a significant challenge due to the complex interactions between multiple participants with varying load profiles, distributed energy resources, and storage systems. Traditional cost…
This paper studies an incentive structure for cooperation and its stability in peer-assisted services when there exist multiple content providers, using a coalition game theoretic approach. We first consider a generalized coalition…
Motivated by the fact that the worth of a coalition may depend on the order in which agents arrive, Nowak and Radzik (1994) (NR) introduced cooperative games with generalized characteristic functions. We study such temporal cooperative…
Shapley values, which were originally designed to assign attributions to individual players in coalition games, have become a commonly used approach in explainable machine learning to provide attributions to input features for black-box…
Traditionally social sciences are interested in structuring people in multiple groups based on their individual preferences. This pa- per suggests an approach to this problem in the framework of a non- cooperative game theory. Definition of…
Cooperative interval game is a cooperative game in which every coalition gets assigned some closed real interval. This models uncertainty about how much the members of a coalition get for cooperating together. In this paper we study…
In cooperative games with transferable utilities, the Shapley value is an extreme case of marginalism while the Equal Division rule is an extreme case of egalitarianism. The Shapley value does not assign anything to the non-productive…
Motivated by the markets operating on fast time scales, we present a framework for online coalitional games with time-varying coalitional values and propose real-time payoff distribution mechanisms. Specifically, we design two online…