Related papers: Beckmann's approach to multi-item multi-bidder auc…
This paper studies optimal auction design when valuations depend endogenously on post-auction collaboration between the seller and the winning bidder. Both parties exert non-contractible efforts after the auction, generating a double moral…
We consider an outsourcing problem where a software agent procures multiple services from providers with uncertain reliabilities to complete a computational task before a strict deadline. The service consumer requires a procurement strategy…
Many real-world optimisation problems are defined over both categorical and continuous variables, yet efficient optimisation methods such asBayesian Optimisation (BO) are not designed tohandle such mixed-variable search spaces. Recent…
We provide simple and approximately revenue-optimal mechanisms in the multi-item multi-bidder settings. We unify and improve all previous results, as well as generalize the results to broader cases. In particular, we prove that the better…
Real-time bidding (RTB) systems, which utilize auctions to allocate user impressions to competing advertisers, continue to enjoy success in digital advertising. Assessing the effectiveness of such advertising remains a challenge in research…
We consider the problem of revenue-optimal dynamic mechanism design in settings where agents' types evolve over time as a function of their (both public and private) experience with items that are auctioned repeatedly over an infinite…
We consider the problem of optimal exchange which can be formulated as a kind of optimal transportation problem. The existence of an optimal solution and a duality theorem for the optimal exchange problem are proved in case of completely…
A double auction game with an infinite number of buyers and sellers is introduced. All sellers posses one unit of a good, all buyers desire to buy one unit. Each seller and each buyer has a private valuation of the good. The distribution of…
We provide a method to solve optimization problem when objective function is a complex stochastic simulator of an urban transportation system. To reach this goal, a Bayesian optimization framework is introduced. We show how the choice of…
Bidding in simultaneous auctions is challenging because an agent's value for a good in one auction may depend on the uncertain outcome of other auctions: the so-called exposure problem. Given the gap in understanding of general simultaneous…
A fundamental economic question is that of designing revenue-maximizing mechanisms in dynamic environments. This paper considers a simple yet compelling market model to tackle this question, where forward-looking buyers arrive at the market…
Ridesharing and ridesourcing services have become widespread, and pricing the rides is a crucial problem for these systems. We propose and analyze a budget-balanced and strategy-proof auction, the Weighted Minimum Surplus (WMS) auction, for…
Digital advertising constitutes one of the main revenue sources for online platforms. In recent years, some advertisers tend to adopt auto-bidding tools to facilitate advertising performance optimization, making the classical \emph{utility…
We introduce a price impact model which accounts for finite market depth, tightness and resilience. Its coupled bid- and ask-price dynamics induce convex liquidity costs. We provide existence of an optimal solution to the classical problem…
A recent line of research has established a novel desideratum for designing approximately-revenue-optimal multi-item mechanisms, namely the buy-many constraint. Under this constraint, prices for different allocations made by the mechanism…
The theory of Optimal Transport (OT) and Martingale Optimal Transport (MOT) were inspired by problems in economics and finance and have flourished over the past decades, making significant advances in theory and practice. MOT considers the…
This work analyzes the inverse optimal transport (IOT) problem under Bregman regularization. We establish well-posedness results, including existence, uniqueness (up to equivalence classes of solutions), and stability, under several…
We study the equivalence between the weighted least gradient problem and the weighted Beckmann minimal flow problem or equivalently, the optimal transport problem with Riemannian cost. Thanks to this equivalence, we prove existence and…
We study a version of the classical Cayley-Moser optimal stopping problem, in which a seller must sell an asset by a given deadline, with the offers, which are independent random variables with a known distribution, arriving at random…
We consider a generalization of the third degree price discrimination problem studied in Bergemann et al. (2015), where an intermediary between the buyer and the seller can design market segments to maximize any linear combination of…