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The security of quantum key distribution relies on the validity of quantum mechanics as a description of nature and on the non-existence of leaky degrees of freedom in the practical implementations. We experimentally demonstrate how, in…
Side-channel attacks currently constitute the main challenge for quantum key distribution (QKD) to bridge theory with practice. So far two main approaches have been introduced to address this problem, (full) device-independent QKD and…
The role of the side channels in the continuous-variable quantum key distribution is studied. It is shown how the information leakage through a side channel from the trusted sender station increases the vulnerability of the protocols to the…
Free-space quantum key distribution (QKD) represents a groundbreaking advancement in secure communication, enabling secure key exchange over vast distances and offering robust encryption for the future quantum internet. However, the…
The security proofs of continuous-variable quantum key distribution are based on the assumptions that the eavesdropper can neither act on the local oscillator nor control Bob's beam splitter. These assumptions may be invalid in practice due…
Imperfect devices in commercial quantum key distribution systems open security loopholes that an eavesdropper may exploit. An example of one such imperfection is the wavelength dependent coupling ratio of the fiber beam splitter. Utilizing…
A secret key shared through quantum key distribution between two cooperative players is secure against any eavesdropping attack allowed by the laws of physics. Yet, such a key can be established only when the quantum channel error rate due…
Quantum key distribution protocols typically make use of a one-way quantum channel to distribute a shared secret string to two distant users. However, protocols exploiting a two-way quantum channel have been proposed as an alternative route…
Quantum key distribution performs the trick of growing a secret key in two distant places connected by a quantum channel. The main reason is that the legitimate users can bound the information gathered by the eavesdropper. In practical…
In the recent decade, it has been discovered that QKD systems are extremely vulnerable to side-channel attacks. In particular, by exploiting the internal working knowledge of practical detectors, it is possible to bring them to an operating…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) establishes secure links between remote communication parties. As a key problem for various QKD protocols, security analysis gives the amount of secure keys regardless of the eavesdropper's computational…
Quantum key distribution can provide unconditionally secure key exchange for remote users in theory. In practice, however, in most quantum key distribution systems, quantum hackers might steal the secure keys by listening to the side…
We devise a simple modification that essentially doubles the efficiency of a well-known quantum key distribution scheme proposed by Bennett and Brassard (BB84). Our scheme assigns significantly different probabilities for the different…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol has been proved to provide unconditionally secure key between two remote legitimate users in theory. Key distribution signals are transmitted in a quantum channel which is established by the…
We suggest that the randomness of the choices of measurement basis by Alice and Bob provides an additional important resource for quantum cryptography. As a specific application, we present a novel protocol for quantum key distribution…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables secure key sharing between distant parties, with several protocols proven resilient against conventional eavesdropping strategies. Here, we introduce a new attack scenario where an eavesdropper, Eve,…
We propose a new scheme for quantum secret sharing (QSS) that uses a modulated high-dimensional time-bin entanglement. By modulating the relative phase randomly by {0,pi}, a sender with the entanglement source can randomly change the sign…
The local oscillator in practical continuous-variable quantum key distribution system fluctuates at any time during the key distribution process, which may open security loopholes for the eavesdropper to hide her eavesdropping behaviors.…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) systems can send signals over more than 100 km standard optical fiber and are widely believed to be secure. Here, we show experimentally for the first time a technologically feasible attack, namely the…
Quantum Key Distribution with the BB84 protocol has been shown to be unconditionally secure even using weak coherent pulses instead of single-photon signals. The distances that can be covered by these methods are limited due to the loss in…