Related papers: Stackelberg-Pareto Synthesis (Extended Version)
This paper is concerned with a linear-quadratic partially observed Stackelberg stochastic differential game with correlated state and observation noises, where the diffusion coefficient does not contain the control variable and the control…
A noncooperative game theoretical approach for analysing opportunistic spectrum access (OSA) in cognitive radio (CR) environments is proposed. New concepts from game theory are applied to spectrum access analysis in order to extract rules…
There has been significant recent interest in leader-follower security games, where the leader dominates the decision process with the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) strategy. However, such a leader-follower scheme may become invalid in…
In two-player finite-state stochastic games of partial observation on graphs, in every state of the graph, the players simultaneously choose an action, and their joint actions determine a probability distribution over the successor states.…
We study the problem of computing Stackelberg equilibria Stackelberg games whose underlying structure is in congestion games, focusing on the case where each player can choose a single resource (a.k.a. singleton congestion games) and one of…
The Stackelberg game depicts a leader-follower relationship wherein decisions are made sequentially, and the Stackelberg equilibrium represents an expected optimal solution when the leader can anticipate the rational response of the…
We solve the problem of automatically computing a new class of environment assumptions in two-player turn-based finite graph games which characterize an ``adequate cooperation'' needed from the environment to allow the system player to win.…
We study online learning in Bayesian Stackelberg games, where a leader repeatedly interacts with a follower whose unknown private type is independently drawn at each round from an unknown probability distribution. The goal is to design…
We study multi-player general-sum Markov games with one of the players designated as the leader and the other players regarded as followers. In particular, we focus on the class of games where the followers are myopic, i.e., they aim to…
This paper studies a language-based opacity enforcement in a two-player, zero-sum game on a graph. In this game, player 1 (P1) wins if it can achieve a secret temporal goal described by the language of a finite automaton, no matter what…
We consider concurrent games played by two-players on a finite-state graph, where in every round the players simultaneously choose a move, and the current state along with the joint moves determine the successor state. We study a…
In this paper, we investigate the rational synthesis problem for concurrent game structure for a variety of objectives ranging from reachability to Muller condition. We propose a new algorithm that establishes the decidability of the non…
We consider two-player games over finite graphs in which both players are restricted by fairness constraints on their moves. Given a two player game graph $G=(V,E)$ and a set of fair moves $E_f\subseteq E$ a player is said to play "fair" in…
We study turn-based stochastic zero-sum games with lexicographic preferences over reachability and safety objectives. Stochastic games are standard models in control, verification, and synthesis of stochastic reactive systems that exhibit…
We study reinforcement learning (RL) for learning a Quantal Stackelberg Equilibrium (QSE) in an episodic Markov game with a leader-follower structure. In specific, at the outset of the game, the leader announces her policy to the follower…
We introduce a way to parameterize automata and games on finite graphs with natural numbers. The parameters are accessed essentially by allowing counting down from the parameter value to 0 and branching depending on whether 0 has been…
Stackelberg games (SGs) constitute the most fundamental and acclaimed models of strategic interactions involving some form of commitment. Moreover, they form the basis of more elaborate models of this kind, such as, e.g., Bayesian…
This paper studies multi-user communication systems with two groups of users: leaders which possess system information, and followers which have no system information using the formulation of Stackelberg games. In such games, the leaders…
Shapleys impossibility result indicates that the two-person bargaining problem has no non-trivial ordinal solution with the traditional game-theoretic bargaining model. Although the result is no longer true for bargaining problems with more…
We introduce a model of sender-receiver stopping games, where the state of the world follows an iid--process throughout the game. At each period, the sender observes the current state, and sends a message to the receiver, suggesting either…