Related papers: Cyber-Physical Risk Assessment for False Data Inje…

Cyber-physical system (CPS) is the foundational backbone of modern critical infrastructures, so ensuring its security and resilience against cyber-attacks is of pivotal importance. This paper addresses the challenge of designing anomaly…

Power system functionality is determined on the basis of the power system state estimation (PSSE). Thus, corruption of the PSSE may lead to severe consequences, such as financial losses, maintenance damage, and disruptions in electricity…

Systematic attack design is essential to understanding the vulnerabilities of cyber-physical systems (CPSs), to better design for resiliency. In particular, false data injection attacks (FDIAs) are well-known and have been shown to be…

Modern Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) are often designed as networked, software-based controller implementations which have been found to be vulnerable to network-level and physical level attacks. A number of research works have proposed…

This paper studies false data injection (FDI) attacks against phasor measurement units (PMUs). As compared to the conventional bad data detector (BDD), an enhanced BDD utilizing the effect of zero injection buses is proposed. Feasible…

Recent works in cyber deception study how to deter malicious intrusion by generating multiple fake versions of a critical document to impose costs on adversaries who need to identify the correct information. However, existing approaches are…

This paper studies the vulnerability of large-scale power systems to false data injection (FDI) attacks through their physical consequences. Prior work has shown that an attacker-defender bi-level linear program (ADBLP) can be used to…

The smart grid combines the classical power system with information technology, leading to a cyber-physical system. In such an environment the malicious injection of data has the potential to cause severe consequences. Classical…

This work studies the modeling of false data injection attacks (FDIAs) in integrated electricity-gas systems (IEGSs). First, we introduce a static state estimation model and bad data detection method for IEGSs. Then, we develop FDIAs on…

Training and evaluating false data injection attack (FDIA) detectors for power systems is constrained by data scarcity. Operational grid measurements are commercially sensitive, and hand-crafted attacks fail to capture complex…

State estimation is a data processing algorithm for converting redundant meter measurements and other information into an estimate of the state of a power system. Relying heavily on meter measurements, state estimation has proven to be…

Deep Neural Networks have proven to be highly accurate at a variety of tasks in recent years. The benefits of Deep Neural Networks have also been embraced in power grids to detect False Data Injection Attacks (FDIA) while conducting…

Reliable grid operation depends on accurate and timely telemetry, making modern power systems vulnerable to communication layer cyberattacks. This paper evaluates how Denial of Service (DoS), Denial of Data (DoD), and False Data Injection…

With the deeper penetration of inverter-based resources in power systems, false data injection attacks (FDIA) are a growing cyber-security concern. They have the potential to disrupt the system's stability like frequency stability, thereby…

False data injection attacks (FDIAs) pose a significant security threat to power system state estimation. To detect such attacks, recent studies have proposed machine learning (ML) techniques, particularly deep neural networks (DNNs).…

Cyberattacks can cause a severe impact on power systems unless detected early. However, accurate and timely detection in critical infrastructure systems presents challenges, e.g., due to zero-day vulnerability exploitations and the…

False Data Injection Attack (FDIA) has become a growing concern in modern cyber-physical power systems. Most existing FDIA detection techniques project the raw measurement data into a high-dimensional latent space to separate normal and…

Future power networks will be characterized by safe and reliable functionality against physical malfunctions and cyber attacks. This paper proposes a unified framework and advanced monitoring procedures to detect and identify network…

In this paper, the problem of simultaneous cyber attack and fault detection and isolation (CAFDI) in cyber-physical systems (CPS) is studied. The proposed solution methodology consists of two filters on the plant and the command and control…

This paper outlines a cyber-physical authentication strategy to protect power system infrastructure against false data injection (FDI) attacks. We demonstrate that it is feasible to use small, low-cost, yet highly attack-resistant security…