Related papers: Delegated Pandora's box
In this paper, we consider a general distributed system with multiple agents who select and then implement actions in the system. The system has an operator with a centralized objective. The agents, on the other hand, are selfinterested and…
We examine vote delegation when preferences of agents are private information. One group of agents (delegators) does not want to participate in voting and abstains under conventional voting or can delegate its votes to the other group…
This paper considers the hidden-action model of the principal-agent problem, in which a principal incentivizes an agent to work on a project using a contract. We investigate whether contracts with bounded payments are learnable and…
The resource allocation problem consists of the optimal distribution of a budget between agents in a group. We consider such a problem in the context of open systems, where agents can be replaced at some time instances. These replacements…
We study a new class of contract design problems where a principal delegates the execution of multiple projects to a set of agents. The principal's expected reward from each project is a combinatorial function of the agents working on it.…
We design a mechanism for Fair and Efficient Distribution of Resources (FEDoR) in the presence of strategic agents. We consider a multiple-instances, Bayesian setting, where in each round the preference of an agent over the set of resources…
When machine learning is outsourced to a rational agent, conflicts of interest might arise and severely impact predictive performance. In this work, we propose a theoretical framework for incentive-aware delegation of machine learning…
Privacy has been a major motivation for distributed problem optimization. However, even though several methods have been proposed to evaluate it, none of them is widely used. The Distributed Constraint Optimization Problem (DCOP) is a…
We introduce an agent-based model of delegation relationships between a principal and an agent, which is based on the standard-hidden action model introduced by Holmstr\"om and, by doing so, provide a model which can be used to further…
We introduce a stochastic principal-agent model. A principal and an agent interact in a stochastic environment, each privy to observations about the state not available to the other. The principal has the power of commitment, both to elicit…
Distributed demand response is a typical distributed optimization problem that requires coordination among multiple agents to satisfy demand response requirements. However, existing distributed algorithms for this problem still face…
This brief note considers the problem of learning with dynamic-optimizing principal-agent setting, in which the agents are allowed to have global perspectives about the learning process, i.e., the ability to view things according to their…
We study two combinatorial contract design models -- multi-agent and multi-action -- where a principal delegates the execution of a costly project to others. In both settings, the principal cannot observe the choices of the agent(s), only…
Allocating scarce resources among agents to maximize global utility is, in general, computationally challenging. We focus on problems where resources enable agents to execute actions in stochastic environments, modeled as Markov decision…
We propose a method for analyzing the distributed random coordinate descent algorithm for solving separable resource allocation problems in the context of an open multiagent system, where agents can be replaced during the process. In…
In this paper, we study the problem of distributed multi-agent optimization over a network, where each agent possesses a local cost function that is smooth and strongly convex. The global objective is to find a common solution that…
This paper describes a number of distributed forward search algorithms for solving multi-agent planning problems. We introduce a distributed formulation of non-optimal forward search, as well as an optimal version, MAD-A*. Our algorithms…
We study a class of cooperative multi-agent optimization problems, where each agent is associated with a local action vector and a local cost, and the goal is to cooperatively find the joint action profile that minimizes the average of the…
This paper addresses the problem of collaboratively satisfying long-term spatial constraints in multi-agent systems. Each agent is subject to spatial constraints, expressed as inequalities, which may depend on the positions of other agents…
We prove an existence result for the principal-agent problem with adverse selection under general assumptions on preferences and allocation spaces. Instead of assuming that the allocation space is finite-dimensional or compact, we consider…