Related papers: Multi-dimensional Network Security Game: How do at…
We propose a type of non-cooperative game, termed multi-cluster aggregative game, which is composed of clusters as players, where each cluster consists of collaborative agents with cost functions depending on their own decisions and the…
This paper investigates the strategic concealment of environment representations used by players in competitive games. We consider a defense scenario in which one player (the Defender) seeks to infer and exploit the representation used by…
Attempts at predatory capture may provoke a defensive response that reduces the very value of the predated resource. We provide a game-theoretic analysis of simultaneous-move, two-player Attacker-Defender games that model such interactions.…
Surveillance-Evasion (SE) games form an important class of adversarial trajectory-planning problems. We consider time-dependent SE games, in which an Evader is trying to reach its target while minimizing the cumulative exposure to a moving…
We propose interdependent defense (IDD) games, a computational game-theoretic framework to study aspects of the interdependence of risk and security in multi-agent systems under deliberate external attacks. Our model builds upon…
One of the natural objectives of the field of the social networks is to predict agents' behaviour. To better understand the spread of various products through a social network arXiv:1105.2434 introduced a threshold model, in which the nodes…
Modern random access mechanisms combine packet repetitions with multi-user detection mechanisms at the receiver to maximize the throughput and reliability in massive Internet of Things (IoT) scenarios. However, optimizing the access policy,…
In the digital age, resources such as open-source software and publicly accessible databases form a crucial category of digital public goods, providing extensive benefits for Internet. This paper investigates networked public goods games…
We consider a variant of the target defense problem in a planar conical environment where a single defender is tasked to capture a sequence of incoming attackers. The attackers' objective is to breach the target boundary without being…
Network slicing to enable resource sharing among multiple tenants --network operators and/or services-- is considered a key functionality for next generation mobile networks. This paper provides an analysis of a well-known model for…
We consider a game in which each player must find a compromise between more daring strategies that carry a high risk for him to be eliminated, and more cautious ones that, however, reduce his final score. For two symmetric players this game…
Network games provide a natural machinery to compactly represent strategic interactions among agents whose payoffs exhibit sparsity in their dependence on the actions of others. Besides encoding interaction sparsity, however, real networks…
In this paper, we study turn-based quantitative multiplayer non zero-sum games played on finite graphs with both reachability and safety objectives. In this framework a player with a reachability objective aims at reaching his own goal as…
We extend the adversarial/non-stochastic multi-play multi-armed bandit (MPMAB) to the case where the number of arms to play is variable. The work is motivated by the fact that the resources allocated to scan different critical locations in…
We study $n$-agent Bayesian Games with $m$-dimensional vector types and linear payoffs, also called Linear Multidimensional Bayesian Games. This class of games is equivalent with $n$-agent, $m$-game Uniform Multigames. We distinguish…
The results of a learning process depend on the input data. There are cases in which an adversary can strategically tamper with the input data to affect the outcome of the learning process. While some datasets are difficult to attack, many…
We explore a scenario involving two sites and a sequential game between a defender and an attacker, where the defender is responsible for securing the sites while the attacker aims to attack them. Each site holds a loss value for the…
This paper proposes a game-theoretic approach to address the problem of optimal sensor placement for detecting cyber-attacks in networked control systems. The problem is formulated as a zero-sum game with two players, namely a malicious…
To verify the robustness of a program or protocol, it is common in the computer science community to rely on the theoretical framework of game theory. In particular, if one seeks to enforce a desired property, or specification, despite an…
In this paper we consider a defending problem on a network. In the model, the defender holds a total defending resource of R, which can be distributed to the nodes of the network. The defending resource allocated to a node can be shared by…