Related papers: Multi-dimensional Network Security Game: How do at…

We study two-player security games which can be viewed as sequences of nonzero-sum matrix games played by an Attacker and a Defender. The evolution of the game is based on a stochastic fictitious play process. Players do not have access to…

We consider an attacker-operator game for monitoring a large-scale network that is comprised on components that differ in their criticality levels. In this zero-sum game, the operator seeks to position a limited number of sensors to monitor…

In the contemporary digital landscape, cybersecurity has become a critical issue due to the increasing frequency and sophistication of cyber attacks. This study utilizes a non-zero-sum game theoretical framework to model the strategic…

We formulate a resource-planning game between an attacker and a defender of a network control system. We consider the network to be operating in closed-loop with a linear quadratic regulator (LQR). We construct a general-sum, two-player,…

This paper studies a stochastic game theoretic approach to security and intrusion detection in communication and computer networks. Specifically, an Attacker and a Defender take part in a two-player game over a network of nodes whose…

We consider a two-player network inspection game, in which a defender allocates sensors with potentially heterogeneous detection capabilities in order to detect multiple attacks caused by a strategic attacker. The objective of the defender…

We study a security game over a network played between a $defender$ and $k$ $attackers$. Every attacker chooses, probabilistically, a node of the network to damage. The defender chooses, probabilistically as well, a connected induced…

Stackelberg security game models and associated computational tools have seen deployment in a number of high-consequence security settings, such as LAX canine patrols and Federal Air Marshal Service. These models focus on isolated systems…

Data injection attacks have recently emerged as a significant threat on the smart power grid. By launching data injection attacks, an adversary can manipulate the real-time locational marginal prices to obtain economic benefits. Despite the…

Stealthy attacks are a major cyber-security threat. In practice, both attackers and defenders have resource constraints that could limit their capabilities. Hence, to develop robust defense strategies, a promising approach is to utilize…

We consider a game in which a strategic defender classifies an intruder as spy or spammer. The classification is based on the number of file server and mail server attacks observed during a fixed window. The spammer naively attacks (with a…

Security challenges accompany the efficiency. The pervasive integration of information and communications technologies (ICTs) makes cyber-physical systems vulnerable to targeted attacks that are deceptive, persistent, adaptive and…

In this paper we use game theory to model poisoning attack scenarios. We prove the non-existence of pure strategy Nash Equilibrium in the attacker and defender game. We then propose a mixed extension of our game model and an algorithm to…

We consider a game-theoretic setting to model the interplay between attacker and defender in the context of information flow, and to reason about their optimal strategies. In contrast with standard game theory, in our games the utility of a…

We consider a variant of the hide-and-seek game in which a seeker inspects multiple hiding locations to find multiple items hidden by a hider. Each hiding location has a maximum hiding capacity and a probability of detecting its hidden…

We study a target coverage problem in which a team of sensing agents, operating under limited communication, must collaboratively monitor targets that may be adaptively repositioned by an attacker. We model this interaction as a zero-sum…

This paper investigates a resilient distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking problem on a directed communication network subject to malicious cyber-attacks. The considered attacks, named as Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, are allowed to…

This paper studies a system security problem in the context of observability based on a two-person noncooperative infinitely repeated game. Both the attacker and the defender have means to modify the dimension of the unobservable subspace,…

This paper studies the resilience of second-order networked dynamical systems to strategic attacks. We discuss two widely used control laws, which have applications in power networks and formation control of autonomous agents. In the first…

This article considers a two-player strategic game for network routing under link disruptions. Player 1 (defender) routes flow through a network to maximize her value of effective flow while facing transportation costs. Player 2 (attacker)…