Related papers: Parallel Repetition For All 3-Player Games Over Bi…

We introduce a three-player nonlocal game, with a finite number of classical questions and answers, such that the optimal success probability of $1$ in the game can only be achieved in the limit of strategies using arbitrarily…

The core of a game $v$ on $N$, which is the set of additive games $\phi$ dominating $v$ such that $\phi(N)=v(N)$, is a central notion in cooperative game theory, decision making and in combinatorics, where it is related to submodular…

We consider a new class of repeated zero-sum games in which the payoff is the escape rate of a switched dynamical system, where at every stage, the transition is given by a nonexpansive operator depending on the actions of both players.…

This work explores three-player game training dynamics, under what conditions three-player games converge and the equilibria the converge on. In contrast to prior work, we examine a three-player game architecture in which all players…

Evolutionary game theory is a powerful mathematical framework to study how intelligent individuals adjust their strategies in collective interactions. It has been widely believed that it is impossible to unilaterally control players'…

The central result of classical game theory states that every finite normal form game has a Nash equilibrium, provided that players are allowed to use randomized (mixed) strategies. However, in practice, humans are known to be bad at…

We show that a cooperative game may be decomposed into a sum of component games, one for each player, using the combinatorial Hodge decomposition on a graph. This decomposition is shown to satisfy certain efficiency, null-player, symmetry,…

In an $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium, a player can gain at most $\epsilon$ by unilaterally changing his behaviour. For two-player (bimatrix) games with payoffs in $[0,1]$, the best-known$\epsilon$ achievable in polynomial time is 0.3393. In…

Zeckendorf proved that every positive integer $n$ can be written uniquely as the sum of non-adjacent Fibonacci numbers. We use this to create a two-player game. Given a fixed integer $n$ and an initial decomposition of $n = n F_1$, the two…

We consider repeated zero-sum games with incomplete information on the side of Player 2 with the total payoff given by the non-normalized sum of stage gains. In the classical examples the value $V_N$ of such an $N$-stage game is of the…

The long-run behavior of multi-agent learning - and, in particular, no-regret learning - is relatively well-understood in potential games, where players have aligned interests. By contrast, in harmonic games - the strategic counterpart of…

We give a converging semidefinite programming hierarchy of outer approximations for the set of quantum correlations of fixed dimension and derive analytical bounds on the convergence speed of the hierarchy. In particular, we give a…

We introduce a quantum cloning game in which $k$ separate collaborative parties receive a classical input, determining which of them has to share a maximally entangled state with an additional party (referee). We provide the optimal winning…

In this paper, we introduce and study a class of games called price-coupling games that arise in many scenarios, especially in the electricity industry. In a price-coupling game, there is a part of the objective function of a player which…

We consider multi-player graph games with partial-observation and parity objective. While the decision problem for three-player games with a coalition of the first and second players against the third player is undecidable, we present a…

We consider concurrent games played on graphs. At every round of a game, each player simultaneously and independently selects a move; the moves jointly determine the transition to a successor state. Two basic objectives are the safety…

The designs of many large-scale systems today, from traffic routing environments to smart grids, rely on game-theoretic equilibrium concepts. However, as the size of an $N$-player game typically grows exponentially with $N$, standard game…

Communication is a crucial ingredient in every kind of collaborative work. But what is the least possible amount of communication required for a given task? We formalize this question by introducing a new framework for distributed…

We study new classes of games, called zero-sum equivalent games and zero-sum equivalent potential games, and prove decomposition theorems involving these classes of games. We say that two games are "strategically equivalent" if, for every…

The paper is concerned with two-person dynamic zero-sum games. We investigate the limit of value functions of finite horizon games with long run average cost as the time horizon tends to infinity, and the limit of value functions of…