Related papers: Order of Commitments in Bayesian Persuasion with P…

Large parts of professional human communication proceed in a request-reply fashion, whereby requests contain specifics of the information desired while replies can deliver the required information. However, time limitations often force…

This work studies a dynamic mechanism design problem in which a principal delegates decision makings to a group of privately-informed agents without the monetary transfer or burning. We consider that the principal privately possesses…

The literature on strategic communication originated with the influential cheap talk model, which precedes the Bayesian persuasion model by three decades. This model describes an interaction between two agents: sender and receiver. The…

We study the following repeated non-atomic routing game. In every round, nature chooses a state in an i.i.d. manner according to a publicly known distribution, which influences link latency functions. The system planner makes private route…

The classical model of signaling games assumes that the receiver exactly know the type space (private information) of the sender and be able to discriminate each type of the sender distinctly. However, the justification of this assumption…

Transparency of information disclosure has always been considered an instrumental component of effective governance, accountability, and ethical behavior in any organization or system. However, a natural question follows: \emph{what is the…

We study the multi-user Bayesian persuasion game between one encoder and two decoders, where the first decoder is better informed than the second decoder. We consider two perfect links, one to the first decoder only, and the other to both…

An uninformed sender publicly commits to an informative experiment about an uncertain state, privately observes its outcome, and sends a cheap-talk message to a receiver. We provide an algorithm valid for arbitrary state-dependent…

This paper studies the persuasion of a receiver who accesses information only if she exerts costly attention effort. A sender designs an experiment to persuade the receiver to take a specific action. The experiment affects the receiver's…

We study Bayesian persuasion when the receiver evaluates actions by reward-side Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) rather than expected utility. CVaR preferences break the standard action-based direct-recommendation reduction: merging signals…

We study the problem of computing correlated strategies to commit to in games with multiple leaders and followers. To the best of our knowledge, this problem is widely unexplored so far, as the majority of the works in the literature focus…

High-stakes auctions are often preceded by nonbinding communication between bidders and the seller. Motivated by these practices, this paper examines a two-period model in which two bidders send private cheap talk messages to the seller…

Persuasion, a fundamental social capability for humans, remains a challenge for AI systems such as large language models (LLMs). Current studies often overlook the strategic use of information asymmetry in message design or rely on strong…

In repeated interactions between individuals, we do not expect that exactly the same situation will occur from one time to another. Contrary to what is common in models of repeated games in the literature, most real situations may differ a…

In this work, we proposed a new $N$-person game in which the players can bet on two options, for example represented by two boxers. Some of the players have privileged information about the boxers and part of them can provide this…

We define a model of interactive communication where two agents with private types can exchange information before a game is played. The model contains Bayesian persuasion as a special case of a one-round communication protocol. We define…

This paper analyzes a finite horizon dynamic signaling game motivated by the well-known strategic information transmission problems in economics. The mathematical model involves information transmission between two agents, a sender who…

Learning or estimating game models from data typically entails inducing separate models for each setting, even if the games are parametrically related. In empirical mechanism design, for example, this approach requires learning a new game…

We propose a new notion of credibility for Bayesian persuasion problems. A disclosure policy is credible if the sender cannot profit from tampering with her messages while keeping the message distribution unchanged. We show that the…

In this paper we revisit the basic variant of the classical secretary problem. We propose a new approach in which we separate between an agent that evaluates the secretary performance and one that has to make the hiring decision. The…