Related papers: Reduced-Form Allocations with Complementarity: A 2…

In cooperative multiagent planning, it can often be beneficial for an agent to make commitments about aspects of its behavior to others, allowing them in turn to plan their own behaviors without taking the agent's detailed behavior into…

We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible items among a set of agents. We consider the notion of (approximate) maximin share (MMS) and we provide an improved lower bound of $1/2$ (which is tight) for the case of…

In this paper, we analyze the problem of how to adapt the concept of proportionality to situations where several perfectly divisible resources have to be allocated among certain set of agents that have exactly one claim which is used for…

Shapleys impossibility result indicates that the two-person bargaining problem has no non-trivial ordinal solution with the traditional game-theoretic bargaining model. Although the result is no longer true for bargaining problems with more…

A principal must decide between two options. Which one she prefers depends on the private information of two agents. One agent always prefers the first option; the other always prefers the second. Transfers are infeasible. One application…

We consider dominant strategy implementation in private values settings, when agents have multi-dimensional types, the set of alternatives is finite, monetary transfers are allowed, and agents have quasi-linear utilities. We show that any…

The classical alternating minimization (or projection) algorithm has been successful in the context of solving optimization problems over two variables. The iterative nature and simplicity of the algorithm has led to its application to many…

Motivated by the problem of market power in electricity markets, we introduced in previous works a mechanism for simplified markets of two agents with linear cost. In standard procurement auctions, the market power resulting from the…

We study the problem of agent-based negotiation in combinatorial domains. It is difficult to reach optimal agreements in bilateral or multi-lateral negotiations when the agents' preferences for the possible alternatives are not common…

The assignment problem is one of the most well-studied settings in social choice, matching, and discrete allocation. We consider the problem with the additional feature that agents' preferences involve uncertainty. The setting with…

We consider the bilateral trade problem, in which two agents trade a single indivisible item. It is known that the only dominant-strategy truthful mechanism is the fixed-price mechanism: given commonly known distributions of the buyer's…

A multiagent system may be thought of as an artificial society of autonomous software agents and we can apply concepts borrowed from welfare economics and social choice theory to assess the social welfare of such an agent society. In this…

The host of a game presents two indistinguishable envelopes to an agent. One of the envelopes is randomly selected and allocated to the agent. The agent is informed that the monetary content of one of the envelopes is twice that of the…

We consider repeated allocation of a shared resource via a non-monetary mechanism, wherein a single item must be allocated to one of multiple agents in each round. We assume that each agent has i.i.d. values for the item across rounds, and…

The Stable Roommates problem involves matching a set of agents into pairs based on the agents' strict ordinal preference lists. The matching must be stable, meaning that no two agents strictly prefer each other to their assigned partners. A…

Severe impossibility results restrict the design of strategyproof random assignment mechanisms, and trade-offs are necessary when aiming for more demanding efficiency requirements, such as ordinal or rank efficiency. We introduce hybrid…

Consider a dynamic task allocation problem, where tasks are unknowingly distributed over an environment. This paper considers each task comprised of two sequential subtasks: detection and completion, where each subtask can only be carried…

We introduce a graceful approach to probabilistic inference called bounded conditioning. Bounded conditioning monotonically refines the bounds on posterior probabilities in a belief network with computation, and converges on final…

Two-sided matchings are an important theoretical tool used to model markets and social interactions. In many real life problems the utility of an agent is influenced not only by their own choices, but also by the choices that other agents…

In this paper, we propose a combined approach with second-order optimality conditions of the lower level problem to study constraint qualifications and optimality conditions for bilevel programming problems. The new method is inspired by…