Related papers: Incentive Compatible Queues Without Money
We study the problem of scheduling periodic real-time tasks so as to meet their individual minimum reward requirements. A task generates jobs that can be given arbitrary service times before their deadlines. A task then obtains rewards…
We consider crowdsourcing problems where the users are asked to provide evaluations for items; the user evaluations are then used directly, or aggregated into a consensus value. Lacking an incentive scheme, users have no motive in making…
We consider the scheduling problem on $n$ strategic unrelated machines when no payments are allowed, under the objective of minimizing the makespan. We adopt the model introduced in [Koutsoupias, Theory Comput. Syst. (2014)] where a machine…
In this paper we consider a real time queuing system with rewards and deadlines. We assume that packet processing time is known upon arrival, as is the case in communication networks. This assumption allows us to demonstrate that the well…
We consider the problem of scheduling in multi-class, parallel-server queuing systems with uncertain rewards from job-server assignments. In this scenario, jobs incur holding costs while awaiting completion, and job-server assignments yield…
Scheduling is a critical part of practical computer systems, and scheduling has also been extensively studied from a theoretical perspective. Unfortunately, there is a gap between theory and practice, as the optimal scheduling policies…
Motivated by the increasing popularity of learning and predicting human user behavior in communication and computing systems, in this paper, we investigate the fundamental benefit of predictive scheduling, i.e., predicting and pre-serving…
Competitive analysis of online algorithms has commonly been applied to understand the behaviour of real-time systems during overload conditions. While competitive analysis provides insight into the behaviour of certain algorithms, it is…
We study a fair resource scheduling problem, where a set of interval jobs are to be allocated to heterogeneous machines controlled by agents. Each job is associated with release time, deadline, and processing time such that it can be…
A queue is required when a service provider is not able to handle jobs arriving over the time. In a highly flexible and dynamic environment, some jobs might demand for faster execution at run-time especially when the resources are limited…
Mechanism design is addressed in the context of fair allocations of indivisible goods with monetary compensation. Motivated by a real-world social choice problem, mechanisms with verification are considered in a setting where (i) agents'…
We initiate the study of incentive-compatible forecasting competitions in which multiple forecasters make predictions about one or more events and compete for a single prize. We have two objectives: (1) to incentivize forecasters to report…
Most practical scheduling applications involve some uncertainty about the arriving times and lengths of the jobs. Stochastic online scheduling is a well-established model capturing this. Here the arrivals occur online, while the processing…
We consider schemes for obtaining truthful reports on a common but hidden signal from large groups of rational, self-interested agents. One example are online feedback mechanisms, where users provide observations about the quality of a…
In many scheduling applications, minimizing delays is of high importance. One adverse effect of such delays is that the reward for completion of a job may decay over time. Indeed in healthcare settings, delays in access to care can result…
In many traditional job scheduling settings, it is assumed that one knows the time it will take for a job to complete service. In such cases, strategies such as shortest job first can be used to improve performance in terms of measures such…
The problem of scheduling with testing in the framework of explorable uncertainty models environments where some preliminary action can influence the duration of a task. In the model, each job has an unknown processing time that can be…
We consider active learning under incentive compatibility constraints. The main application of our results is to economic experiments, in which a learner seeks to infer the parameters of a subject's preferences: for example their attitudes…
In a scheduling game, each player owns a job and chooses a machine to execute it. While the social cost is the maximal load over all machines (makespan), the cost (disutility) of each player is the completion time of its own job. In the…
Auctions in which agents' payoffs are random variables have received increased attention in recent years. In particular, recent work in algorithmic mechanism design has produced mechanisms employing internal randomization, partly in…