Related papers: Matching with Transfers under Distributional Const…

We present a general analysis of multidimensional matching problems with transferable utility, paying particular attention to the case in which the dimensions of heterogeneity on the two sides of the market are unequal. A particular…

Many-to-one matching markets exist in numerous different forms, such as college admissions, matching medical interns to hospitals for residencies, assigning housing to college students, and the classic firms and workers market. In all these…

We study multi-type housing markets, where there are $p\ge 2$ types of items, each agent is initially endowed one item of each type, and the goal is to design mechanisms without monetary transfer to (re)allocate items to the agents based on…

This paper studies multilateral matching in which agents may negotiate contracts within any coalition. We assume scale economies such that an agent substitutes some existing contracts with new ones only if the latter involve a set of…

Bipartite matching, where agents on one side of a market are matched to agents or items on the other, is a classical problem in computer science and economics, with widespread application in healthcare, education, advertising, and general…

We focus on the one-to-one two-sided matching model with two disjoint sets of agents of equal size, where each agent in a set has preferences on the agents in the other set modeled by a linear order. A matching mechanism associates a set of…

Stable matching in a community consisting of men and women is a classical combinatorial problem that has been the subject of intense theoretical and empirical study since its introduction in 1962 in a seminal paper by Gale and Shapley, who…

Electricity market operators worldwide use mixed-integer linear programming to solve the allocation problem in wholesale electricity markets. Prices are typically determined based on the duals of relaxed versions of this optimization…

We develop a method using parameterized linear equations to define trading mechanisms in market design models. Our method adeptly addresses challenges arising from factors such as complex endowments or coarse priorities, while offering…

We consider two-sided matching markets, and study the incentives of agents to circumvent a centralized clearing house by signing binding contracts with one another. It is well-known that if the clearing house implements a stable match and…

We study matching markets with ties, where workers on one side of the market may have tied preferences over jobs, determined by their matching utilities. Unlike classical two-sided markets with strict preferences, no single stable matching…

The assignment game, introduced by Shapley and Shubik (1971), is a classic model for two-sided matching markets between buyers and sellers. In the original assignment game, it is assumed that payments lead to transferable utility and that…

Two-sided matching markets have long existed to pair agents in the absence of regulated exchanges. A common example is school choice, where a matching mechanism uses student and school preferences to assign students to schools. In such…

When several two-sided matching markets merge into one, it is inevitable that some agents will become worse off if the matching mechanism used is stable. I formalize this observation by defining the property of integration monotonicity,…

We study stability notions for networked many-to-many matching markets with individually insignificant agents in distributional form. Outcomes are formulated as joint distributions over characteristics of agents and contract choices.…

We study partial identification of the preference parameters in the one-to-one matching model with perfectly transferable utilities. We do so without imposing parametric distributional assumptions on the unobserved heterogeneity and with…

The past few years have seen a surge of work on fairness in allocation problems where items must be fairly divided among agents having individual preferences. In comparison, fairness in settings with preferences on both sides, that is,…

The assignment game models a housing market where buyers and sellers are matched, and transaction prices are set so that the resulting allocation is stable. Shapley and Shubik showed that every stable allocation is necessarily built on a…

We consider a market in which both suppliers and consumers compete for a product via scalar-parameterized supply offers and demand bids. Scalar-parameterized offers/bids are appealing due to their modeling simplicity and desirable…

We consider the two-sided stable matching setting in which there may be uncertainty about the agents' preferences due to limited information or communication. We consider three models of uncertainty: (1) lottery model --- in which for each…