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Decision-making individuals often imitate their highest-earning fellows rather than optimize their own utilities, due to bounded rationality and incomplete information. Perpetual fluctuations between decisions have been reported as the…
Oscillations often take place in populations of decision makers that are either a coordinator, who takes action only if enough others do so, or an anticoordinator, who takes action only if few others do so. Populations consisting of…
Decision-making individuals are often considered to be either imitators who copy the action of their most successful neighbors or best-responders who maximize their benefit against the current actions of their neighbors. In the context of…
Whether a population of decision-making individuals will reach a state of satisfactory decisions is a fundamental problem in studying collective behaviors. In the framework of evolutionary game theory and by means of potential functions,…
In social situations with which evolutionary game is concerned, individuals are considered to be heterogeneous in various aspects. In particular, they may differently perceive the same outcome of the game owing to heterogeneity in…
Imitation is a key component of human social behavior, and is widely used by both children and adults as a way to navigate uncertain or unfamiliar situations. But in an environment populated by multiple heterogeneous agents pursuing…
The most common assumption in evolutionary game theory is that players should adopt a strategy that warrants the highest payoff. However, recent studies indicate that the spatial selection for cooperation is enhanced if an appropriate…
The orderly behaviors observed in large-scale groups, such as fish schooling and the organized movement of crowds, are both ubiquitous and essential for the survival and stability of these systems. Understanding how such complex collective…
In two-strategy decision-making problems, individuals often imitate the highest earners or choose either the common or rare strategy. Individuals who benefit from the common strategy are conformists, whereas those who profit by choosing the…
Coordination games admit two types of equilibria: pure equilibria, where all players successfully coordinate their actions, and mixed equilibria, where players frequently experience miscoordination. The existing literature shows that under…
Imitation is widely observed in populations of decision-making agents. Using our recent convergence results for asynchronous imitation dynamics on networks, we consider how such networks can be efficiently driven to a desired equilibrium…
Imitation is an important learning heuristic in animal and human societies. Previous explorations report that the fate of individuals with cooperative strategies is sensitive to the protocol of imitation, leading to a conundrum about how…
Decisions to pursue higher education are not fully explained by economic incentives, with social influence and peer effects playing a crucial, yet dynamically understudied, role. This paper develops a theoretical non-linear dynamics model…
We study a stochastic model of anonymous influence with conformist and anti-conformist individuals. Each agent with a `yes' or `no' initial opinion on a certain issue can change his opinion due to social influence. We consider anonymous…
In this work, we analyse the relationship between heterogeneity and cooperation. Previous investigations suggest that this relation is nontrivial, as some authors found that heterogeneity sustains cooperation, while others obtained…
In this paper, we study the problem of cost optimisation of individual-based institutional incentives (reward, punishment, and hybrid) for guaranteeing a certain minimal level of cooperative behaviour in a well-mixed, finite population. In…
We introduce a new model that mimics the strong and sudden effects induced by conformity in tightly interacting human societies. Such effects range from mere crowd phenomena to dramatic political turmoil. The model is a modified version of…
In many social dilemmas, individuals tend to generate a situation with low payoffs instead of a system optimum ("tragedy of the commons"). Is the routing of traffic a similar problem? In order to address this question, we present…
Individual choices are either based on personal experience or on information provided by peers. The latter case, causes individuals to conform to the majority in their neighborhood. Such herding behavior may be very efficient in aggregating…
The theoretical study of social learning typically assumes that each agent's action affects only her own payoff. In this paper, I present a model in which agents' actions directly affect the payoffs of other agents. On a discrete time line,…