Related papers: Sequentially Optimal Pricing under Informational R…
We consider a seller faced with buyers which have the ability to delay their decision, which we call patience. Each buyer's type is composed of value and patience, and it is sampled i.i.d. from a distribution. The seller, using posted…
A canonical setting for non-monetary online resource allocation is one where agents compete over multiple rounds for a single item per round, with i.i.d. valuations and additive utilities across rounds. With $n$ symmetric agents, a natural…
I study the optimal pricing process for selling a unit good to a buyer with prospect theory preferences. In the presence of probability weighting, the buyer is dynamically inconsistent and can be either sophisticated or naive about her own…
We propose a simple randomized rule for the optimization of prices in revenue management with contextual information. It is known that the certainty equivalent pricing rule, albeit popular, is sub-optimal. We show that, by allowing a small…
We study auctions that are robust at any scale, i.e., they can be applied to sell both expensive and cheap items and achieve the best multiplicative approximations of the optimal revenue in the worst case. We show that the optimal mechanism…
Online Resource Allocation problem is a central problem in many areas of Computer Science, Operations Research, and Economics. In this problem, we sequentially receive $n$ stochastic requests for $m$ kinds of shared resources, where each…
This paper presents an optimal allocation problem in a financial market with one risk-free and one risky asset, when the market is driven by a stochastic market price of risk. We solve the problem in continuous time, for an investor with a…
We study the indirect cost of information from sequential information cost minimization. A key sub-additivity condition, together with monotonicity equivalently characterizes the class of indirect cost functions generated from any direct…
Peer prediction mechanisms are often adopted to elicit truthful contributions from crowd workers when no ground-truth verification is available. Recently, mechanisms of this type have been developed to incentivize effort exertion, in…
We study the problem of characterizing revenue optimal auctions for single-minded buyers. Each buyer is interested only in a specific bundle of items and has a value for the same. Both his bundle and its value are his private information.…
We examine the dynamics of informational efficiency in a market with asymmetrically informed, boundedly rational traders who adaptively learn optimal strategies using simple multiarmed bandit (MAB) algorithms. The strategies available to…
The distributionally robust Markov Decision Process (MDP) approach asks for a distributionally robust policy that achieves the maximal expected total reward under the most adversarial distribution of uncertain parameters. In this paper, we…
We study the impact of learning on the optimal policy and the time-to-decision in an infinite-horizon Bayesian sequential decision model with two irreversible alternatives, exit and expansion. In our model, a firm undertakes a small-scale…
In the online (time-series) search problem, a player is presented with a sequence of prices which are revealed in an online manner. In the standard definition of the problem, for each revealed price, the player must decide irrevocably…
Classical optimal auction theory assumes that bids reach the seller directly. We study how this picture changes when a revenue-maximizing intermediary controls access to the seller's auction. Motivated by blockchain auctions, online…
This paper studies the equilibrium price of an asset that is traded in continuous time between N agents who have heterogeneous beliefs about the state process underlying the asset's payoff. We propose a tractable model where agents maximize…
A rich line of recent work has studied distributionally robust learning approaches that seek to learn a hypothesis that performs well, in the worst-case, on many different distributions over a population. We argue that although the most…
Recoverable robust optimization is a multi-stage approach, where it is possible to adjust a first-stage solution after the uncertain cost scenario is revealed. We analyze this approach for a class of selection problems. The aim is to choose…
Classic results show that even an arbitrarily small correlation across bidders' information can enable full surplus extraction in auctions and related mechanism design settings. Motivated by this fragility, we study the information…
In markets with budget-constrained buyers, competitive equilibria need not be efficient in the utilitarian sense, or maximise the seller's revenue. We consider a setting with multiple divisible goods. Competitive equilibrium outcomes, and…