Related papers: Insecurity problem for assertions remains in NP
In the symbolic verification of cryptographic protocols, a central problem is deciding whether a protocol admits an execution which leaks a designated secret to the malicious intruder. Rusinowitch & Turuani (2003) show that, when…
Cryptographic protocols aim at securing communications over insecure networks such as the Internet, where dishonest users may listen to communications and interfere with them. A secure communication has a different meaning depending on the…
There is a large amount of work dedicated to the formal verification of security protocols. In this paper, we revisit and extend the NP-complete decision procedure for a bounded number of sessions. We use a, now standard, deducibility…
Most of the security services in the connected world of cyber-physical systems necessitate authenticating a large number of nodes privately. In this paper, the private authentication problem is considered which consists of a certificate…
There are often situations where two remote users each have data, and wish to (i) verify the equality of their data, and (ii) whenever a discrepancy is found afterwards, determine which of the two modified his data. The most common example…
P vs NP problem is the most important unresolved problem in the field of computational complexity. Its impact has penetrated into all aspects of algorithm design, especially in the field of cryptography. The security of cryptographic…
Quantum cryptography uses techniques and ideas from physics and computer science. The combination of these ideas makes the security proofs of quantum cryptography a complicated task. To prove that a quantum-cryptography protocol is secure,…
In this paper, we use the witness-functions to analyze cryptographic protocols for secrecy under nonempty equational theories. The witness-functions are safe metrics used to compute security. An analysis with a witness-function consists in…
We present a different proof of the insecurity problem for XOR, solved in by Chevalier, Kuesters, Rusinowitch and Turuani (2005). Our proof uses the notion of typed terms and well-typed proofs, and removes a restriction on the class of…
In this paper, we show how practical the little theorem of witness functions is in detecting security flaws in some category of cryptographic protocols. We convey a formal analysis of the Needham-Schroeder symmetric-key protocol in the…
Cryptographic protocols are often specified by narrations, i.e., finite sequences of message exchanges that show the intended execution of the protocol. Another use of narrations is to describe attacks. We propose in this paper to compile,…
We study the implementability problem for an expressive class of symbolic communication protocols involving multiple participants. Our symbolic protocols describe infinite states and data values using dependent refinement predicates.…
Many privacy-type properties of security protocols can be modelled using trace equivalence properties in suitable process algebras. It has been shown that such properties can be decided for interesting classes of finite processes (i.e.,…
This paper discloses a simple algorithm for encrypting text messages, based on the NP-completeness of the subset sum problem, such that the similarity between encryptions is roughly proportional to the semantic similarity between their…
Security protocols are concurrent processes that communicate using cryptography with the aim of achieving various security properties. Recent work on their formal verification has brought procedures and tools for deciding trace equivalence…
The verification of security protocols is essential, in order to ensure the absence of potential attacks. However, verification results are only valid with respect to the assumptions under which the verification was performed. These…
Neural networks are increasingly employed in safety-critical domains. This has prompted interest in verifying or certifying logically encoded properties of neural networks. Prior work has largely focused on checking existential properties,…
A cryptographic protocol (CP) is a distributed algorithm designed to provide a secure communication in an insecure environment. CPs are used, for example, in electronic payments, electronic voting procedures, database access systems, etc.…
Large Language Models (LLMs) as stochastic systems may generate numbers that deviate from available data, a failure known as \emph{numeric hallucination}. Existing safeguards -- retrieval-augmented generation, citations, and uncertainty…
In this paper, we present a new semi-decidable procedure to analyze cryptographic protocols for secrecy based on a new class of functions that we call: the Witness-Functions. A Witness-Function is a reliable function that guarantees the…