Related papers: Stackelberg Strategic Guidance for Heterogeneous R…
Trajectory guidance requires a leader robotic agent to assist a follower robotic agent to cooperatively reach the target destination. However, planning cooperation becomes difficult when the leader serves a family of different followers and…
Guided cooperation allows intelligent agents with heterogeneous capabilities to work together by following a leader-follower type of interaction. However, the associated control problem becomes challenging when the leader agent does not…
As assembly tasks grow in complexity, collaboration among multiple robots becomes essential for task completion. However, centralized task planning has become inadequate for adapting to the increasing intelligence and versatility of robots,…
Shared control allows the human driver to collaborate with an assistive driving system while retaining the ability to make decisions and take control if necessary. However, human-vehicle teaming and planning are challenging due to…
We investigate a co-design problem, encompassing simultaneous design of system infrastructure and control, through a game-theoretical framework. To this end, we propose the co-design problem as a two-layer hierarchical strategic…
Stackelberg games are a classic example of bilevel optimization problems, which are often encountered in game theory and economics. These are complex problems with a hierarchical structure, where one optimization task is nested within the…
In multi-agent problems requiring a high degree of cooperation, success often depends on the ability of the agents to adapt to each other's behavior. A natural solution concept in such settings is the Stackelberg equilibrium, in which the…
Humans have an impressive ability to solve complex coordination problems in a fully distributed manner. This ability, if learned as a set of distributed multirobot coordination strategies, can enable programming large groups of robots to…
We study Stackelberg equilibria in finitely repeated games, where the leader commits to a strategy that picks actions in each round and can be adaptive to the history of play (i.e. they commit to an algorithm). In particular, we study…
In this article we propose a game-theoretic approach to the multi-robot task allocation problem using the framework of global games. Each task is associated with a global signal, a real-valued number that captures the task execution…
We present an approach to task scheduling in heterogeneous multi-robot systems. In our setting, the tasks to complete require diverse skills. We assume that each robot is multi-skilled, i.e., each robot offers a subset of the possible…
Multi-robot cooperation requires agents to make decisions that are consistent with the shared goal without disregarding action-specific preferences that might arise from asymmetry in capabilities and individual objectives. To accomplish…
This paper studies heterogeneous multi-team collaboration through dynamic robot allocation, where robots are treated as transferable resources. Leveraging Hamilton's rule from ecology as an altruistic decision-making mechanism, we propose a…
The Stackelberg game depicts a leader-follower relationship wherein decisions are made sequentially, and the Stackelberg equilibrium represents an expected optimal solution when the leader can anticipate the rational response of the…
For a team of heterogeneous robots executing multiple tasks, we propose a novel algorithm to optimally allocate tasks to robots while accounting for their different capabilities. Motivated by the need that robot teams have in many…
Multi-robot planning and coordination in uncertain environments is a fundamental computational challenge, since the belief space increases exponentially with the number of robots. In this paper, we address the problem of planning in…
Many real-world strategic games involve interactions between multiple players. We study a hierarchical multi-player game structure, where players with asymmetric roles can be separated into leaders and followers, a setting often referred to…
In a Stackelberg game, a leader commits to a randomized strategy, and a follower chooses their best strategy in response. We consider an extension of a standard Stackelberg game, called a discrete-time dynamic Stackelberg game, that has an…
We provide a general approach to reformulating any continuous-time stochastic Stackelberg differential game under closed-loop strategies as a single-level optimisation problem with target constraints. More precisely, we consider a…
Strategic interaction in congested systems is commonly modelled using Stackelberg games, where competing leaders anticipate the behaviour of self-interested followers. A key limitation of existing models is that they typically ignore agents…