Related papers: Minimizing Expected Intrusion Detection Time in Ad…

Patrolling is one of the central problems in operational security. Formally, a patrolling problem is specified by a set $U$ of nodes (admissible defender's positions), a set $T \subseteq U$ of vulnerable targets, an admissible defender's…

We focus on adversarial patrolling games on arbitrary graphs, where the Defender can control a mobile resource, the targets are alarmed by an alarm system, and the Attacker can observe the actions of the mobile resource of the Defender and…

Adversarial Patrolling games form a subclass of Security games where a Defender moves between locations, guarding vulnerable targets. The main algorithmic problem is constructing a strategy for the Defender that minimizes the worst damage…

A defender dispatches patrollers to circumambulate a perimeter to guard against potential attacks. The defender decides on the time points to dispatch patrollers and each patroller's direction and speed, as long as the long-run rate…

The incremental diffusion of machine learning algorithms in supporting cybersecurity is creating novel defensive opportunities but also new types of risks. Multiple researches have shown that machine learning methods are vulnerable to…

Anomaly detection is a method for discovering unusual and suspicious behavior. In many real-world scenarios, the examined events can be directly linked to the actions of an adversary, such as attacks on computer networks or frauds in…

We consider a variant of pursuit-evasion games where a single defender is tasked to defend a static target from a sequence of periodically arriving intruders. The intruders' objective is to breach the boundary of a circular target without…

A model of strategy formulation is used to study how an adaptive attacker learns to overcome a moving target cyber defense. The attacker-defender interaction is modeled as a game in which a defender deploys a temporal platform migration…

Attack detection is usually approached as a classification problem. However, standard classification tools often perform poorly because an adaptive attacker can shape his attacks in response to the algorithm. This has led to the recent…

In cybersecurity, attackers range from brash, unsophisticated script kiddies and cybercriminals to stealthy, patient advanced persistent threats. When modeling these attackers, we can observe that they demonstrate different risk-seeking and…

Detection of malicious behavior is a fundamental problem in security. One of the major challenges in using detection systems in practice is in dealing with an overwhelming number of alerts that are triggered by normal behavior (the…

In this paper, we propose a planning framework to generate a defense strategy against an attacker who is working in an environment where a defender can operate without the attacker's knowledge. The objective of the defender is to covertly…

Advanced persistent threats (APTs) are stealthy attacks which make use of social engineering and deception to give adversaries insider access to networked systems. Against APTs, active defense technologies aim to create and exploit…

Currently the Dempster-Shafer based algorithm and Uniform Random Probability based algorithm are the preferred method of resolving security games, in which defenders are able to identify attackers and only strategy remained ambiguous.…

We study automated intrusion response and formulate the interaction between an attacker and a defender as an optimal stopping game where attack and defense strategies evolve through reinforcement learning and self-play. The game-theoretic…

The rapid expansion of Internet use has increased system exposure to cyber threats, with advanced persistent threats (APTs) being especially challenging due to their stealth, prolonged duration, and multi-stage attacks targeting high-value…

We study security games in which a defender commits to a mixed strategy for protecting a finite set of targets of different values. An attacker, knowing the defender's strategy, chooses which target to attack and for how long. If the…

In Stackelberg security games when information about the attacker's payoffs is uncertain, algorithms have been proposed to learn the optimal defender commitment by interacting with the attacker and observing their best responses. In this…

We consider a variant of the target defense problem where a single defender is tasked to capture a sequence of incoming intruders. The intruders' objective is to breach the target boundary without being captured by the defender. As soon as…

The privacy of machine learning models has become a significant concern in many emerging Machine-Learning-as-a-Service applications, where prediction services based on well-trained models are offered to users via pay-per-query. The lack of…