Related papers: The Metric Distortion of Multiwinner Voting
We consider the fair division of indivisible items among $n$ agents with additive non-negative normalized valuations, with the goal of obtaining high value guarantees, that is, close to the proportional share for each agent. We prove that…
In many practical scenarios, a population is divided into disjoint groups for better administration, e.g., electorates into political districts, employees into departments, students into school districts, and so on. However, grouping people…
We study two-stage committee elections where voters have dynamic preferences over candidates; at each stage, a committee is chosen under a given voting rule. We are interested in identifying a winning committee for the second stage that…
We study social choice mechanisms in an implicit utilitarian framework with a metric constraint, where the goal is to minimize \textit{Distortion}, the worst case social cost of an ordinal mechanism relative to underlying cardinal…
Metric embedding has become a common technique in the design of algorithms. Its applicability is often dependent on how high the embedding's distortion is. For example, embedding finite metric space into trees may require linear distortion…
Multi-winner voting is the process of selecting a fixed-size set of representative candidates based on voters' preferences. It occurs in applications ranging from politics (parliamentary elections) to the design of modern computer…
In multiagent settings where the agents have different preferences, preference aggregation is a central issue. Voting is a general method for preference aggregation, but seminal results have shown that all general voting protocols are…
We introduce the threshold $q$-voter opinion dynamics where an agent, facing a binary choice, can change its mind when at least $q_0$ amongst $q$ neighbors share the opposite opinion. Otherwise, the agent can still change its mind with a…
We study the distributed facility location problem, where a set of agents with positions on the line of real numbers are partitioned into disjoint districts, and the goal is to choose a point to satisfy certain criteria, such as optimize an…
We consider the approval-based model of elections, and undertake a computational study of voting rules which select committees whose size is not predetermined. While voting rules that output committees with a predetermined number of winning…
We study a constrained distributed heterogeneous two-facility location problem, where a set of agents with private locations on the real line are divided into disjoint groups. The constraint means that the facilities can only be built in a…
We study a generic framework that provides a unified view on two important classes of problems: (i) extensions of the k-median problem where clients are interested in having multiple facilities in their vicinity (e.g., due to the fact that,…
In the recently introduced model of fair partitioning of friends, there is a set of agents located on the vertices of an underlying graph that indicates the friendships between the agents. The task is to partition the graph into $k$…
Impartial selection has recently received much attention within the multi-agent systems community. The task is, given a directed graph representing nominations to the members of a community by other members, to select the member with the…
In this paper, we study several generalizations of multiway cut where the terminals can be chosen as \emph{representatives} from sets of \emph{candidates} $T_1,\ldots,T_q$. In this setting, one is allowed to choose these representatives so…
We present an alternative voting system that aims at bridging the gap between proportional representative systems and majoritarian, single winner election systems. The system lets people vote for multiple parties, but then assigns each…
This paper revisits the limitations of the Median Voter Theorem and introduces a novel framework to analyze the optimal economic ideological positions of political parties. By incorporating Nash equilibrium, we examine the mechanisms and…
Bribery in election (or computational social choice in general) is an important problem that has received a considerable amount of attention. In the classic bribery problem, the briber (or attacker) bribes some voters in attempting to make…
In the computational social choice literature, there has been great interest in understanding how computational complexity can act as a barrier against manipulation of elections. Much of this literature, however, makes the assumption that…
To choose a suitable multiwinner voting rule is a hard and ambiguous task. Depending on the context, it varies widely what constitutes the choice of an ``optimal'' subset of alternatives. In this paper, we provide a quantitative analysis of…