Related papers: Inverse maximum theorems and some consequences
The preferences of players in non-cooperative games represent their choice in the set of available options, which meet the completeness property if players are able to compare any pair of available options. In the existing literature, the…
In the context of large population symmetric games, approximate Nash equilibria are introduced through equilibrium solutions of the corresponding mean field game in the sense that the individual gain from optimal unilateral deviation under…
We study generalized games with full row rank equality constraints and we provide a strikingly simple proof of strong monotonicity of the associated KKT operator. This allows us to show linear convergence to a variational equilibrium of the…
A classic model to study strategic decision making in multi-agent systems is the normal-form game. This model can be generalised to allow for an infinite number of pure strategies leading to continuous games. Multi-objective normal-form…
We prove three results on the existence and structure of Nash equilibria for quasisupermodular games. A theorem is purely order-theoretic, and the other two involve topological hypotheses. Our topological results genralize Zhou's theorem…
We study pure-strategy Nash equilibria in multi-player concurrent deterministic games, for a variety of preference relations. We provide a novel construction, called the suspect game, which transforms a multi-player concurrent game into a…
We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer…
We consider graphical $n$-person games with perfect information that have no Nash equilibria in pure stationary strategies. Solving these games in mixed strategies, we introduce probabilistic distributions in all non-terminal positions. The…
We propose a unifying additive theory for standard conventions in Combinatorial Game Theory, including normal-, mis\`ere- and scoring-play, studied by Berlekamp, Conway, Dorbec, Ettinger, Guy, Larsson, Milley, Neto, Nowakowski, Renault,…
We suggest to look at quantum measurement outcomes not through the lens of probability theory, but instead through decision theory. We introduce an original game-theoretical framework, model and algorithmic procedure where measurement…
The large majority of risk-sharing transactions involve few agents, each of whom can heavily influence the structure and the prices of securities. This paper proposes a game where agents' strategic sets consist of all possible sharing…
In this paper, we introduce the concept of infinitely split Nash equilibrium in repeated games in which the profile sets are chain-complete posets. Then by using a fixed point theorem on posets in [8], we prove an existence theorem. As an…
The noncooperative Nash equilibrium solution of classical games corresponds to a rational expectations attitude on the part of the players. However, in many cases, games played by human players have outcomes very different from Nash…
A fundamental open problem in monotone game theory is the computation of a specific generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) among all the available ones, e.g. the optimal equilibrium with respect to a system-level objective. The existing GNE…
Constructing effective algorithms to converge to Nash Equilibrium (NE) is an important problem in algorithmic game theory. Prior research generally posits that the upper bound on the convergence rate for games is $O\left(T^{-1/2}\right)$.…
We present a method of backward induction for computing approximate subgame perfect Nash equilibria of infinitely repeated games with discounted payoffs. This uses the selection monad transformer, combined with the searchable set monad…
The recent mean field game (MFG) formalism facilitates otherwise intractable computation of approximate Nash equilibria in many-agent settings. In this paper, we consider discrete-time finite MFGs subject to finite-horizon objectives. We…
In this article we study the convergence of the Nash Equilibria in a N-player differential game towards the optimal strategies in the Mean Field Games, when the dynamic of the generic player includes a reflection process which guarantees…
We study learning in complete-information games, allowing the players' models of their environment to be misspecified. We introduce Berk--Nash rationalizability: the largest self-justified set of actions -- meaning each action in the set is…
In this work, we study potential games and Markov potential games under stochastic cost and bandit feedback. We propose a variant of the Frank-Wolfe algorithm with sufficient exploration and recursive gradient estimation, which provably…