Related papers: Fair Stable Matching Meets Correlated Preferences
The stable marriage problem is a well-known problem of matching men to women so that no man and woman who are not married to each other both prefer each other. Such a problem has a wide variety of practical applications ranging from…
We study the problem of finding "fair" stable matchings in the Stable Marriage problem with Incomplete lists (SMI). In particular, we seek stable matchings that are optimal with respect to profile, which is a vector that indicates the…
We consider a model for repeated stochastic matching where compatibility is probabilistic, is realized the first time agents are matched, and persists in the future. Such a model has applications in the gig economy, kidney exchange, and…
In many labor markets, workers and firms are connected via affiliative relationships. A management consulting firm wishes to both accept the best new workers but also place its current affiliated workers at strong firms. Similarly, a…
The stable marriage problem has been introduced in order to describe a complex system where individuals attempt to optimise their own satisfaction, subject to mutually conflicting constraints. Due to the potential large applicability of…
The Stable Roommates problem (SR) is characterized by the preferences of agents over other agents as roommates: each agent ranks all others in strict order of preference. A solution to SR is then a partition of the agents into pairs so that…
We study stable matching problems where agents have multilayer preferences: There are $\ell$ layers each consisting of one preference relation for each agent. Recently, Chen et al. [EC '18] studied such problems with strict preferences,…
Stable marriage of a two-sided market with unit demand is a classic problem that arises in many real-world scenarios. In addition, a unique stable marriage in this market simplifies a host of downstream desiderata. In this paper, we explore…
We study the stable marriage problem in two-sided markets with randomly generated preferences. We consider agents on each side divided into a constant number of "soft tiers", which intuitively indicate the quality of the agent.…
The celebrated Efficiency-Adjusted Deferred Acceptance mechanism (EADA) improves the efficiency of the DA algorithm via consented priority violations. Notwithstanding its many merits, we show that EADA can improve only two students when an…
Several countries successfully use centralized matching schemes for school or higher education assignment, or for entry-level labour markets. In this paper we explore the computational aspects of a possible similar scheme for assigning…
We study the stable marriage problem in the partial information setting where the agents, although they have an underlying true strict linear order, are allowed to specify partial orders. Specifically, we focus on the case where the agents…
The classical stable marriage problem asks for a matching between a set of men and a set of women with no blocking pairs, which are pairs formed by a man and a woman who would both prefer switching from their current status to be paired up…
Motivated by a plethora of practical examples where bias is induced by automated-decision making algorithms, there has been strong recent interest in the design of fair algorithms. However, there is often a dichotomy between fairness and…
Stability is crucial in matching markets, yet in many real-world settings - from hospital residency allocations to roommate assignments - full stability is either impossible to achieve or can come at the cost of leaving many agents…
The stable marriage (SM) problem has a wide variety of practical applications, ranging from matching resident doctors to hospitals, to matching students to schools, or more generally to any two-sided market. In the classical formulation, n…
Increasing aggregate diversity (or catalog coverage) is an important system-level objective in many recommendation domains where it may be desirable to mitigate the popularity bias and to improve the coverage of long-tail items in…
We study the design of a decentralized two-sided matching market in which agents' search is guided by the platform. There are finitely many agent types, each with (potentially random) preferences drawn from known type-specific…
We consider priority-based school choice problems with farsighted students. We show that a singleton set consisting of the matching obtained from the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism is a farsighted stable set. However, the matching…
Stable matchings have been studied extensively in social choice literature. The focus has been mostly on integral matchings, in which the nodes on the two sides are wholly matched. A fractional matching, which is a convex combination of…