Related papers: Explaining Preferences by Multiple Patterns in Vot…
We tackle the problem of constructive preference elicitation, that is the problem of learning user preferences over very large decision problems, involving a combinatorial space of possible outcomes. In this setting, the suggested…
CP-nets and their variants constitute one of the main AI approaches for specifying and reasoning about preferences. CI-nets, in particular, are a CP-inspired formalism for representing ordinal preferences over sets of goods, which are…
When people pursue rewards in stochastic environments, they often match their choice frequencies to the observed target frequencies, even when this policy is demonstrably sub-optimal. We used a ``hide and seek'' task to evaluate this…
A useful capability is that of classifying some agent's behavior using data from a sequence, or trace, of sensor measurements. The sensor selection problem involves choosing a subset of available sensors to ensure that, when generated,…
In this paper, we study the problem of Participatory Budgeting (PB) with approval ballots, inspired by Multi-Winner Voting schemes. We present generalized preference aggregation methods for participatory budgeting, especially for finding…
We address the question of aggregating the preferences of voters in the context of participatory budgeting. We scrutinize the voting method currently used in practice, underline its drawbacks, and introduce a novel scheme tailored to this…
We establish that all strategy-proof social choice rules in strict preference domains follow necessarily a two-step procedure. In the first step, agents are asked to reveal some specific information about their preferences. Afterwards, a…
In "The Logic of Campaigning", Dean and Parikh consider a candidate making campaign statements to appeal to the voters. They model these statements as Boolean formulas over variables that represent stances on the issues, and study optimal…
In this paper, we study some multiagent variants of the knapsack problem. Fluschnik et al. [AAAI 2019] considered the model in which every agent assigns some utility to every item. They studied three preference aggregation rules for finding…
We study two-stage committee elections where voters have dynamic preferences over candidates; at each stage, a committee is chosen under a given voting rule. We are interested in identifying a winning committee for the second stage that…
Given a data-set of consumer behaviour, the Revealed Preference Graph succinctly encodes inferred relative preferences between observed outcomes as a directed graph. Not all graphs can be constructed as revealed preference graphs when the…
We present a new modeling technique for solving the problem of ecological inference, in which individual-level associations are inferred from labeled data available only at the aggregate level. We model aggregate count data as arising from…
We show that one-dimensional Euclidean preference profiles can not be characterized in terms of finitely many forbidden substructures. This result is in strong contrast to the case of single-peaked and single-crossing preference profiles,…
We offer a rationalization of the weak generalized axiom of revealed preference (WGARP) for both finite and infinite data sets of consumer choice. We call it maximin rationalization, in which each pairwise choice is associated with a…
It is important to study how strategic agents can affect the outcome of an election. There has been a long line of research in the computational study of elections on the complexity of manipulative actions such as manipulation and bribery.…
We provide the first social choice theory approach to the question of what constitutes a community in a social network. Inspired by the classic preferences models in social choice theory, we start from an abstract social network framework,…
Selecting $k$ out of $m$ items based on the preferences of $n$ heterogeneous agents is a widely studied problem in algorithmic game theory. If agents have approval preferences over individual items and harmonic utility functions over…
A voter sits on each vertex of an infinite tree of degree $k$, and has to decide between two alternative opinions. At each time step, each voter switches to the opinion of the majority of her neighbors. We analyze this majority process when…
We focus on a generalization of the classic Minisum approval voting rule, introduced by Barrot and Lang (2016), and referred to as Conditional Minisum (CMS), for multi-issue elections with preferential dependencies. Under this rule, voters…
In multiagent settings where the agents have different preferences, preference aggregation is a central issue. Voting is a general method for preference aggregation, but seminal results have shown that all general voting protocols are…