Related papers: Epidemic Population Games And Evolutionary Dynamic…
We propose a mathematical model to analyze the effects of anti-infection behavior on the equilibrium states of an infectious disease. The anti-infection behavior is incorporated into a classical epidemiological SIR model, by considering the…
In this paper, we investigate game-theoretic strategies for containing spreading processes on large-scale networks. Specifically, we consider the class of networked susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) epidemics where a large population…
This paper studies the spread dynamics of a stochastic SIRS epidemic model with nonlinear incidence and varying population size, which is formulated as a piecewise deterministic Markov process. A threshold dynamic determined by the basic…
Evolutionary game theory is a framework to formalize the evolution of collectives ("populations") of competing agents that are playing a game and, after every round, update their strategies to maximize individual payoffs. There are two…
Many socio-economic and biological processes can be modeled as systems of interacting individuals. The behaviour of such systems can be often described within game-theoretic models. In these lecture notes, we introduce fundamental concepts…
We combine incentive, adaptive, and time-scale dynamics to study multipopulation dynamics on the simplex equipped with a large class of Riemmanian metrics, simultaneously generalizing and extending many dynamics commonly studied in dynamic…
We discuss a model for evolutionary game dynamics in a growing, network-structured population. In our model, new players can either make connections to random preexisting players or preferentially attach to those that have been successful…
Controlling evolutionary game-theoretic dynamics is a problem of paramount importance for the systems and control community, with several applications spanning from social science to engineering. Here, we study a population of individuals…
We study a coupled epidemic-mobility model in which, at each time, individuals move in a network of spatially-distributed regions (sub-populations) according to a Continuous Time Markov Chain (CTMC) and subsequently interact with the local…
Epidemic modelling on complex networks has been studied intensively all the time. The majority of relative research assumes that the time scale of the underlying network evolution is much larger compared to the propagation dynamics on it,…
Evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations has been extensively explored in past decades. However, most previous studies assume that payoffs of individuals are fully determined by the strategic behaviors of interacting parties and…
We analyze the stability of a nonlinear dynamical model describing the noncooperative strategic interactions among the agents of a finite collection of populations. Each agent selects one strategy at a time and revises it repeatedly…
In recent years, classical epidemic models, which assume stationary behavior of individuals, have been extended to include an adaptive heterogeneous response of the population to the current state of the epidemic. However, it is widely…
In this paper, we consider a two-player two-strategy game with random payoffs in a population subdivided into $d$ demes, each containing $N$ individuals at the beginning of any given generation and experiencing local extinction and…
The SIR model is the cornerstone model for mathematical epidemiology, explaining key epidemic features such as the second-order transition between disease-free and epidemic states, the initial exponential growth of outbreaks or the…
We study the evolutionary dynamics of games under environmental feedback using replicator equations for two interacting populations. One key feature is to consider jointly the co-evolution of the dynamic payoff matrices and the state of the…
Adaptive populations such as those in financial markets and distributed control can be modeled by the Minority Game. We consider how their dynamics depends on the agents' initial preferences of strategies, when the agents use linear or…
Game theoretic tools are utilized to analyze a one-locus continuous selection model of sex-specific meiotic drive by considering nonequivalence of the viabilities of reciprocal heterozygotes that might be noticed at an imprinted locus. The…
We study a model of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in which the probabilities that agents choose suboptimal actions are dependent on payoff consequences. We prove a sample path large deviation principle, characterizing the rate of…
According to the fundamental principle of evolutionary game theory, the more successful strategy in a population should spread. Hence, during a strategy imitation process a player compares its payoff value to the payoff value held by a…