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The paper studies the problem of auction design in a setting where the auctioneer accesses the knowledge of the valuation distribution only through statistical samples. A new framework is established that combines the statistical decision…
We study the efficiency of sequential first-price item auctions at (subgame perfect) equilibrium. This auction format has recently attracted much attention, with previous work establishing positive results for unit-demand valuations and…
Cooperative transmission can greatly improve communication system performance by taking advantage of the broadcast nature of wireless channels. Most previous work on resource allocation for cooperation transmission is based on centralized…
We study the problem of a seller dynamically pricing $d$ distinct types of indivisible goods, when faced with the online arrival of unit-demand buyers drawn independently from an unknown distribution. The goods are not in limited supply,…
We study a simple problem of allocating common-value goods. The designer seeks to allocate the goods to as many unit-demand agents as possible without monetary transfers, while agents, who possess partial private information about the…
In millimeterWave wireless networks the rapidly varying wireless channels demand fast and dynamic resource allocation mechanisms. This challenge is hereby addressed by a distributed approach that optimally solves the fundamental resource…
We study auction design in a setting where agents can communicate over a censorship-resistant broadcast channel like the ones we can implement over a public blockchain. We seek to design credible, strategyproof auctions in a model that…
Daily deals platforms such as Amazon Local, Google Offers, GroupOn, and LivingSocial have provided a new channel for merchants to directly market to consumers. In order to maximize consumer acquisition and retention, these platforms would…
Models of auctions or tendering processes are introduced. In every round of bidding the players select their bid from a probability distribution and whenever a bid is unsuccessful, it is discarded and replaced. For simple models, the…
We consider the question of whether collusion among bidders (a "bidding ring") can be supported in equilibrium of unrepeated first-price auctions. Unlike previous work on the topic such as that by McAfee and McMillan [1992] and Marshall and…
Selling a single item to $n$ self-interested buyers is a fundamental problem in economics, where the two objectives typically considered are welfare maximization and revenue maximization. Since the optimal mechanisms are often impractical…
In first-price auctions for display advertising, exchanges typically communicate the "minimum-bid-to-win" to bidders after the auction as feedback for their bidding algorithms. For a winner, this is the second-highest bid, while for losing…
We study a repeated trading problem in which a mechanism designer facilitates trade between a single seller and multiple buyers. Our model generalizes the classic bilateral trade setting to a multi-buyer environment. Specifically, the…
In many first-price auctions, bidders face considerable strategic uncertainty: They cannot perfectly anticipate the other bidders' bidding behavior. We propose a model in which bidders do not know the entire distribution of opponent bids…
Core-selecting combinatorial auctions are popular auction designs that constrain prices to eliminate the incentive for any group of bidders -- with the seller -- to renegotiate for a better deal. They help overcome the low-revenue issues of…
We consider the problem of the optimization of bidding strategies in prior-dependent revenue-maximizing auctions, when the seller fixes the reserve prices based on the bid distributions. Our study is done in the setting where one bidder is…
This paper proposes a diffusion-based auto-bidding framework that leverages graph representations to model large-scale auction environments. In such settings, agents must dynamically optimize bidding strategies under constraints defined by…
In last decades, diversity and accuracy have been regarded as two important measures in evaluating a recommendation model. However, a clear concern is that a model focusing excessively on one measure will put the other one at risk, thus it…
This paper studies optimal auction design when valuations depend endogenously on post-auction collaboration between the seller and the winning bidder. Both parties exert non-contractible efforts after the auction, generating a double moral…
Many auction settings implicitly or explicitly require that bidders are treated equally ex-ante. This may be because discrimination is philosophically or legally impermissible, or because it is practically difficult to implement or…