Related papers: Outsourcing Adjudication to Strategic Jurors
Decision making under uncertainty is a key component of many AI settings, and in particular of voting scenarios where strategic agents are trying to reach a joint decision. The common approach to handle uncertainty is by maximizing expected…
Algorithmic decision making is increasingly prevalent, but often vulnerable to strategic manipulation by agents seeking a favorable outcome. Prior research has shown that classifier abstention (allowing a classifier to decline making a…
We study strategic interaction in linear-quadratic network games where agents act on subjective, misspecified models of their environment. Agents observe noisy aggregate signals generated by local network externalities and interpret them…
Traditionally, the problem of apportioning the seats of a legislative body has been viewed as a one-shot process with no dynamic considerations. While this approach is reasonable for some settings, dynamic aspects play an important role in…
The strategic selection of resources by selfish agents is a classic research direction, with Resource Selection Games and Congestion Games as prominent examples. In these games, agents select available resources and their utility then…
During deliberation processes, mediators and facilitators typically need to select a small and representative set of opinions later used to produce digestible reports for stakeholders. In online deliberation platforms, algorithmic selection…
The timing of strategic exit is one of the most important but difficult business decisions, especially under competition and uncertainty. Motivated by this problem, we examine a stochastic game of exit in which players are uncertain about…
We study the incentivized information acquisition problem, where a principal hires an agent to gather information on her behalf. Such a problem is modeled as a Stackelberg game between the principal and the agent, where the principal…
When humans are subject to an algorithmic decision system, they can strategically adjust their behavior accordingly (``game'' the system). While a growing line of literature on strategic classification has used game-theoretic modeling to…
We study how to allocate resources to participants who can strategically misrepresent their deservingness at a cost. A principal assigns item(s) (or money) among multiple agents on the basis of their costly signals. Each agent's signal…
In repeated-game applications where both the collusive and non-collusive outcomes can be supported as equilibria, researchers must resolve underlying selection questions if theory will be used to understand counterfactual policies. One…
We describe a two-stage mechanism that fully implements the set of efficient outcomes in two-agent environments with quasi-linear utilities. The mechanism asks one agent to set prices for each outcome, and the other agent to make a choice,…
We formulate computation offloading as a decentralized decision-making problem with autonomous agents. We design an interaction mechanism that incentivizes agents to align private and system goals by balancing between competition and…
We study the problem of agent selection in causal strategic learning under multiple decision makers and address two key challenges that come with it. Firstly, while much of prior work focuses on studying a fixed pool of agents that remains…
Strategy-proof mechanisms are widely used in market design. In an abstract allocation framework where outside options are available to agents, we obtain two results for strategy-proof mechanisms. They provide a unified foundation for…
Equipping agents with the capacity to justify made decisions using supporting evidence represents a cornerstone of accountable decision-making. Furthermore, ensuring that justifications are in line with human expectations and societal norms…
We study principal-agent problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme -- called contract -- in order to induce an agent to take a costly, unobservable action leading to favorable outcomes. We consider a…
We revisit the problem of designing strategyproof mechanisms for allocating divisible items among two agents who have linear utilities, where payments are disallowed and there is no prior information on the agents' preferences. The…
Decision making can be difficult when there are many actors (or agents) who may be coordinating or competing to achieve their various ideas of the optimum outcome. Here I present a simple decision making model with an explicitly…
Iterated coopetitive games capture the situation when one must efficiently balance between cooperation and competition with the other agents over time in order to win the game (e.g., to become the player with highest total utility).…