Related papers: Protecting fiber-optic quantum key distribution so…
The security of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems relies on the physical integrity of their components. While laser-damage attacks (LDAs) using high-power continuous-wave (cw) lasers have been well studied, the threat posed by pulsed…
Here, we investigate the security of the practical one-way CVQKD and CV-MDI-QKD systems under laser seeding attack. In particular, Eve can inject a suitable light into the laser diodes of the light source modules in the two kinds of…
Due to cost benefits, supply chains of integrated circuits (ICs) are largely outsourced nowadays. However, passing ICs through various third-party providers gives rise to many threats, like piracy of IC intellectual property or insertion of…
Counterfactual quantum key distribution protocols allow two sides to establish a common secret key using an insecure channel and authenticated public communication. As opposed to many other quantum key distribution protocols, part of the…
A new class of quantum cryptography (QC) protocols that are robust against the most general photon number splitting attacks in a weak coherent pulse implementation has been recently proposed. In this article we give a quite exhaustive…
The decoy state protocol has been considered to be one of the most important methods to protect the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) with a weak coherent source. Here we test two experimental approaches to generating the decoy…
Recent advancements in quantum key distribution have led to the development of various modulator-free transmitters. Among their advantages, these transmitters offer enhanced security against Trojan-horse attacks. However, practical…
Security in quantum cryptography is continuously challenged by inventive attacks targeting the real components of a cryptographic setup, and duly restored by new counter-measures to foil them. Due to their high sensitivity and complex…
The security proof of continuous variable quantum key distribution(CV QKD) based on two assumptions that the eavesdropper can neither act on the local oscillator nor control Bob's beam splitter. These assumptions maybe invalid in practice…
A novel integrated optical source capable of emitting faint pulses with different polarization states and with different intensity levels at 100 MHz has been developed. The source relies on a single laser diode followed by four…
Optical key distribution (OKD) protects the physical layer of communication links by taking advantage of the inherent noise present in the photodetection process. It allows for efficient generation of a shared random key between two distant…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) has been proved to be information-theoretically secure in theory. Unfortunately, the imperfect devices in practice compromise its security. Thus, to improve the security property of practical QKD systems, a…
Recently a new quantum key distribution protocol using coherent and thermal states was proposed. In this work this kind of two-layer QKD protocol is formalized and its security against the most common attacks, including external control and…
If devices are physically accessible optical fault injection attacks pose a great threat since the data processed as well as the operation flow can be manipulated. Successful physical attacks may lead not only to leakage of secret…
The peculiar properties of quantum mechanics allow two remote parties to communicate a private, secret key, which is protected from eavesdropping by the laws of physics. So-called quantum key distribution (QKD) implementations always rely…
In recent years, there has been a great effort to prove the security of quantum key distribution (QKD) with a minimum number of assumptions. Besides its intrinsic theoretical interest, this would allow for larger tolerance against device…
In the recent decade, it has been discovered that QKD systems are extremely vulnerable to side-channel attacks. In particular, by exploiting the internal working knowledge of practical detectors, it is possible to bring them to an operating…
Practical implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD) have been shown to be subject to various detector side-channel attacks that compromise the promised unconditional security. Most notable is a general class of attacks adopting the…
It is possible to attack a computer remotely through the front panel LEDs. Following on previous results that showed information leakage at optical wavelengths, now it seems practicable to inject information into a system as well. It is…
We analyze realistic vulnerabilities of decoy-state quantum key distribution (QKD) arising from the combination of laser damage attack (LDA) and unambiguous state discrimination (USD). While decoy-state QKD is designed to protect against…