Related papers: On Reward-Penalty-Selection Games
We consider Stackelberg pricing games, which are also known as bilevel pricing problems, or combinatorial price-setting problems. This family of problems consists of games between two players: the leader and the follower. There is a market…
We consider the repeated prisoner's dilemma (PD). We assume that players make their choices knowing only average payoffs from the previous stages. A player's strategy is a function from the convex hull $\mathfrak{S}$ of the set of payoffs…
We present polynomial-time algorithms as well as hardness results for equilibrium computation in atomic splittable routing games, for the case of general convex cost functions. These games model traffic in freight transportation, market…
This paper considers a two-player game where each player chooses a resource from a finite collection of options. Each resource brings a random reward. Both players have statistical information regarding the rewards of each resource.…
This paper studies partially observable two-person zero-sum semi-Markov games under a probability criterion, in which the system state may not be completely observed. It focuses on the probability that the accumulated rewards of player 1…
We consider a class of hierarchical noncooperative $N$-player games where the $i$th player solves a parametrized stochastic mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) with the caveat that the implicit form of the $i$th…
The matching game is a cooperative game where the value of every coalition is the maximum revenue of players in the coalition can make by forming pairwise disjoint partners. The multiple partners matching game generalizes the matching game…
Two-player games on finite graphs provide a rigorous foundation for modeling the strategic interaction between reactive systems and their environment. While concurrent game semantics naturally capture the synchronous interactions…
The Shapley value, originating from cooperative game theory, has been employed to define responsibility measures that quantify the contributions of database facts to obtaining a given query answer. For non-numeric queries, this is done by…
The solution to a Nash or a nonsymmetric bargaining game is obtained by maximizing a concave function over a convex set, i.e., it is the solution to a convex program. We show that each 2-player game whose convex program has linear…
We present a structural classification of constraint satisfaction problems (CSP) described by reflexive complete $2$-edge-coloured graphs. In particular, this classification extends the structural dichotomy for graph homomorphism problems…
Two straightforward methods to extend an assessment of individual elements to groups are to sum individual assessments or to treat the group as a single merged element and assess it accordingly. In this work, we analyze another natural…
Consider a very simple class of (finite) games: after an initial move by nature, each player makes one move. Moreover, the players have common interests: at each node, all the players get the same payoff. We show that the problem of…
A wireless relay network (WRN) has recently emerged as an effective way to increase communication capacity and extend a coverage area with a low cost. In the WRN, multiple service providers (SPs) can cooperate to share their resources…
Constraint satisfaction problems (CSPs) are a natural class of decision problems where one must decide whether there is an assignment to variables that satisfies a given formula. Schaefer's dichotomy theorem, and its extension to all…
Many of the famous single-player games, commonly called puzzles, can be shown to be NP-Complete. Indeed, this class of complexity contains hundreds of puzzles, since people particularly appreciate completing an intractable puzzle, such as…
We consider a class of two-player zero-sum stochastic games with finite state and compact control spaces, which we call stochastic shortest path (SSP) games. They are undiscounted total cost stochastic dynamic games that have a cost-free…
In Feinstein and Rudloff (2023), it was shown that the set of Nash equilibria for any non-cooperative $N$ player game coincides with the set of Pareto optimal points of a certain vector optimization problem with non-convex ordering cone. To…
We consider a problem of placing generators of rewards to be collected by randomly moving agents in a network. In many settings, the precise mobility pattern may be one of several possible, based on parameters outside our control, such as…
The core of a cooperative game on a set of players $N$ is one of the most popular concept of solution. When cooperation is restricted (feasible coalitions form a subcollection $\cF$ of $2^N$), the core may become unbounded, which makes it…