Related papers: On Reward-Penalty-Selection Games
We introduce the notion of linearly representable games. Broadly speaking, these are TU games that can be described by as many parameters as the number of players, like weighted voting games, airport games, or bankruptcy games. We show that…
We study the geometric structure of the set of cooperative transferable utility games having a nonempty core, characterized by Bondareva and Shapley as balanced games. We show that this set is a nonpointed polyhedral cone, and we find the…
The hitting set problem is a well-known NP-hard optimization problem in which, given a set of elements and a collection of subsets, the goal is to find the smallest selection of elements, such that each subset contains at least one element…
Freight forwarding plays a crucial role in facilitating global trade and logistics. However, as the freight forwarding market is extremely fragmented, freight forwarders often face the issue of not being able to fill the available shipping…
We propose a novel unsupervised game-theoretic salient object detection algorithm that does not require labeled training data. First, saliency detection problem is formulated as a non-cooperative game, hereinafter referred to as Saliency…
Game-theoretical approach to the analysis of parallel algorithms is proposed. The approach is based on presentation of the parallel computing as a congestion game. In the game processes compete for resources such as core of a central…
The model of incomplete cooperative games incorporates uncertainty into the classical model of cooperative games by considering a partial characteristic function. Thus the values for some of the coalitions are not known. The main focus of…
The Shapley value (SV) and Least core (LC) are classic methods in cooperative game theory for cost/profit sharing problems. Both methods have recently been proposed as a principled solution for data valuation tasks, i.e., quantifying the…
We study Recursive Concurrent Stochastic Games (RCSGs), extending our recent analysis of recursive simple stochastic games to a concurrent setting where the two players choose moves simultaneously and independently at each state. For…
Constraint satisfaction problems (CSPs) are ubiquitous in theoretical computer science. We study the problem of StrongCSPs, i.e. instances where a large induced sub-instance has a satisfying assignment. More formally, given a CSP instance…
Finding actions that satisfy the constraints imposed by both external inputs and internal representations is central to decision making. We demonstrate that some important classes of constraint satisfaction problems (CSPs) can be solved by…
State-of-the-art methods for solving 2-player zero-sum imperfect information games rely on linear programming or regret minimization, though not on dynamic programming (DP) or heuristic search (HS), while the latter are often at the core of…
We consider the problem of how to determine a fair source coding rate allocation method for the lossless data compression problem in multiterminal networks, e.g, the wireless sensor network where there are a large number of sources to be…
Cooperative interval games are a generalized model of cooperative games in which the worth of every coalition corresponds to a closed interval representing the possible outcomes of its cooperation. Selections are all possible outcomes of…
The equilibrium selection problem in the generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) has recently been studied as an optimization problem, defined over the set of all variational equilibria achievable through a lower-level non-cooperative…
We study the problem of generating a test sequence that achieves maximal coverage for a reactive system under test. We formulate the problem as a repeated game between the tester and the system, where the system state space is partitioned…
The Shapley value---probably the most important normative payoff division scheme in coalitional games---has recently been advocated as a useful measure of centrality in networks. However, although this approach has a variety of real-world…
We revisit the coalition structure generation problem in which the goal is to partition the players into exhaustive and disjoint coalitions so as to maximize the social welfare. One of our key results is a general polynomial-time algorithm…
In cooperative game theory, games in partition function form are real-valued function on the set of so-called embedded coalitions, that is, pairs $(S,\pi)$ where $S$ is a subset (coalition) of the set $N$ of players, and $\pi$ is a…
We introduce a new allocation rule, the uniform-dividend value (UD-value), for cooperative games whose characteristic function is incomplete. The UD-value assigns payoffs by distributing the total surplus of each family of indistinguishable…