Related papers: Cooperative Security Against Interdependent Risks
We study a market of investments on networks, where each agent (vertex) can invest in any enterprise linked to her, and at the same time, raise capital for her firm's enterprise from other agents she is linked to. Failing to raise…
The aim of this article is to propose a core game theory model of transaction costs wherein it is indicated how direct costs determine the probability of loss and subsequent transaction costs. The existence of optimum is proven, and the way…
Although both data availability and the demand for accurate forecasts are increasing, collaboration between stakeholders is often constrained by data ownership and competitive interests. In contrast to recent proposals within cooperative…
In this paper we address the problem of uncertainty management for robust design, and verification of large dynamic networks whose performance is affected by an equally large number of uncertain parameters. Many such networks (e.g. power,…
Sharing economy is a distributed peer-to-peer economic paradigm, which gives rise to a variety of social interactions for economic purposes. One fundamental distributed decision-making process is coalition formation for sharing certain…
The current framework of network utility maximization for distributed rate allocation assumes fixed channel code rates. However, by adapting the physical layer channel coding, different rate-reliability tradeoffs can be achieved on each…
The introduction of new services, such as Mobile Edge Computing (MEC), requires a massive investment that cannot be assumed by a single stakeholder, for instance the Infrastructure Provider (InP). Service Providers (SPs) however also have…
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods when limited sharing is allowed, that is, each good may be allocated to up to $k$ agents, while incurring a cost for sharing. While classic maximin share (MMS) allocations may not…
We consider game-theoretically secure distributed protocols for coalition games that approximate the Shapley value with small multiplicative error. Since all known existing approximation algorithms for the Shapley value are randomized, it…
We analyze a network formation game in a strategic setting where payoffs of individuals depend only on their immediate neighbourhood. We call these payoffs as localized payoffs. In this game, the payoff of each individual captures (1) the…
In this paper we consider multiple constrained resource allocation problems, where the constraints can be specified by formulating activity dependency restrictions or by using game-theoretic models. All the problems are focused on generic…
We consider a \emph{Social Group} of networked nodes, seeking a "universe" of segments for maximization of their utility. Each node has a subset of the universe, and access to an expensive link for downloading data. Nodes can also acquire…
The cost-sharing connection game is a variant of routing games on a network. In this model, given a directed graph with edge costs and edge capacities, each agent wants to construct a path from a source to a sink with low cost. The users…
Cascade processes are responsible for many important phenomena in natural and social sciences. Simple models of irreversible dynamics on graphs, in which nodes activate depending on the state of their neighbors, have been successfully…
Optimal control of interdependent epidemics spreading over complex networks is a critical issue. We first establish a framework to capture the coupling between two epidemics, and then analyze the system's equilibrium states by categorizing…
In this paper, we study inter-operator spectrum sharing and intra-operator resource allocation in shared spectrum access communication systems and propose efficient dynamic solutions to address both inter-operator and intra-operator…
This paper studies the problem of information theoretic secure communication when a source has private messages to transmit to $m$ destinations, in the presence of a passive adversary who eavesdrops an unknown set of $k$ edges. The…
Optimal behavior in (competitive) situation is traditionally determined with the help of utility functions that measure the payoff of different actions. Given an ordering on the space of revenues (payoffs), the classical axiomatic approach…
Strategyproof mechanisms provide robust equilibrium with minimal assumptions about knowledge and rationality but can be unachievable in combination with other desirable properties such as budget-balance, stability against deviations by…
Efficient allocation and use of limited resources are fundamental to advancing collective welfare and achieving long-term societal sustainability. This challenge involves not only how policymakers distribute scarce resources among…